CHINA WEEKLY

REVIEW

密勒氏評論報

A Weekly Newspaper Established in 1917

Editorial review of

ACHESON'S SPEECH

THE PROTESTANT PROGRAM IN PRESENT DAY CHINA

JAPANESE TRADE REVIVAL POSES THREAT

CHEN PO-TA WRITES ON STALIN AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

JANUARY 21, 1950

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LETTERS From The People

Comments from readers on current topics are cordially invited: their opinions, however, do not necessarily represent the views of The China Weekly Review.

ORDER IN TIENTSIN

To The Editor:

I thought that the Review might be interested in the Provisional Regulations for Order in Tientsin. Among the regulations is a group that takes care of pedestrians and peddlers. "It is prohibited to erect stalls and stock goods in the streets and on the sidewalks (as well as display goods for sale, protruding from shop fronts); stall keepers outside the bazaars shall all be persuaded to apply to the Bureau of Industry and Commerce for licenses and to move into the bazaars." Other traffic regulations include those prohibiting vehicles inside bazaars, prescribing fast and slow lanes, and directing pedestrians to keep on sidewalks; or when there is no sidewalk, that they should walk on the edge of the street. These rules also prescribe that vehicles have requisite equipment such as lights, horns or bells, brakes, life-saving apparatus in the case of boats, and licenses for all vehicles. Another regulation prohibits "display of prowess or play on principal roads or sidewalks." Funeral and wedding processions have been relegated to certain smaller streets; asphalt roads are protected against ironwheeled carts. "Where bicycle racks obstruct traffic they must be replaced by posts with chains." Queues must form at back entrances, on sidestreets, or in yards rather than on main streets. When road sections are undergoing repair, appropriate fencing off should be done and red lanterns should mark off the areas at night.

The consuming public is also protected under the new regulations. Hawkers may not falsify goods; devices resembling those used for gambling are prohibited. Pornographic literature and pictures may not be disseminated.

Regulations governing porters' services protect travelers against being swept off their feet at stations and hotels. One item stipulates that "porters shall stand in rows at designated places and may not argue for precedence nor snatch up passengers' clothes, and baggage." Carfares, guides to passengers, and workers' regulations are to be posted at stations and wharves. The black market ticket racket is to be suppressed.

Concerning advertisements, all such must be approved by the Public Utilities Bureau before public posting, and then only on designated billboards. Billboards must not obstruct traffic and must be removed when outworn. Advertisements for medicines must be approved by the Public Health Bureau before posting. Further, all "ads" must be in keeping with "good morals" and art principles.

Putting in extra temporary seats and standing in aisles at public amusement places is not permitted.

These regulations form a big step toward an orderly new Tientsin.

BETTY CHANG

Tientsin
January 5, 1950

HONGKONG PROBLEM

To The Editor:

According to the idea of some English people, Hongkong, like India, is a pearl that England has in the Far East. But India was at last given up by England.

The word "Hongkong" means "the sweet harbor" in Chinese. Its sweetness is well tasted by the fortune-hunters from England. It is an important spot for the English to trade with China, and also an important port for transportation in South China.

However, we have reason to doubt whether such a small island as Hongkong can hold its importance as a center of commerce and transportation. It seems impossible that the Chinese should allow themselves to be subject to the financial influence of this small island. The future prosperity of the nearby harbors in China and the completion of the Whampoa Harbor in Canton will sooner or later reduce its importance.

Militarily speaking, Hongkong loses much of its importance as a strategic base for England when the two big neighboring islands of Hainan and Formosa are in the possession of another nation. The easy success of the Japanese in capturing the island is proof that it is not a good place for defense.

At present, there are more than 20,000 English soldiers being sent there for defense, for England is worried lest the People's Republic of China take it back by force. How ridiculous it is to think that China should fight another nation at this time for a small island while leaving the vast territory unattended to. The over-sensitiveness of the English government has caused its people to spend a shocking amount of money for nothing. The problem of Hongkong will have to be solved by fair talks and justice.

We lost the island some hundred years ago because we refused to buy opium from the English merchants. Afterwards, England tried to enforce such trade in China by means of war, and the result was that she took the island and forced a lease of a portion of the Kowloon Peninsula. Besides this, England also claimed treaty ports along some of our coastal provinces.

It is very important to note that the Opium War marked the beginning of a sad epoch in our modern history. It was the first incident that led to the disintegration of our sovereignty.

In the past, the common feelings of the people of China either for or against a foreign nation were often unreasonably curbed by corrupt and obsequious officials. At the present moment, under our People's Government, our common feelings are no longer undermined. However, we shall always be ready to befriend any nation or people who really treat us on equal footing.

The solution of the Hongkong problem seems to rest more with England than China today. It is on her honor and justice that we expect to rely to give up the ill-gotten island. Such an act would indicate that England has the heart to give up her out-dated colonial policy which leads to nothing but exploitation.

If fairly handled, the outcome of future negotiations will not only satisfy us, but the English too, for thus they will be able to carry on their long-hoped-for trade with us. There is practically no ground to justify any reluctance on the part of England to deal with us fairly, since she was willing to let a nation hundreds of times bigger than Hongkong be free from her domination.

WANG SHU-TSUNG

Canton
December 26, 1949

LIN PIAO'S VILLAGE

To The Editor:

Here is what a field reporter wrote about General Lin Piao's native village, Lin Chia Wan, in Hwang Kang Hsien, Hupeh:

Lin Chia Wan is at the foot of Tao Lin Shan, where not more than thirty families live. As soon as I entered the village, I was much surprised that a good many peasants warmly greeted me and were very hospitable. Some children gathered around me and vied with one another to be the first to guide me to General Lin's house. They were accustomed to do so because many PLA soldiers had passed through here and called at this place.

I was greatly moved to see that his house should be such a humble hut. In it there was

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SECRETARY ACHESON'S SPEECH

SECRETARY of State Dean Acheson's speech last week is distinguished mainly by the fact that it provides further proof that confusion and wishful thinking are still predominant characteristics of the Truman administration's policy toward Asia.

Speaking of America's long term interest in Asia, Mr. Acheson ignored most of the elementary facts commonly found in the history books. He admitted that this interest was partially shaped by economic, military and other equally concrete considerations but relegated them to the background. The primary motives for American interest in this part of the world, he held, were spiritual concepts, and various independent, unrelated and immaterial things which he variously termed "fundamental beliefs" and "profound beliefs."

He said: "For 50 years it has been the fundamental belief of the American people . . . that the control of China by a foreign power was contrary to American interests. The interesting part about that is it was also contrary to the interests of the people of China. There was not conflict but parallelism in that interest. And so from the time of the announcement of the Open Door policy through the Nine Power Treaty to the very latest resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, we have stated that principle and we believe it. And similarly in all the rest of Asia—in the Philippines, in India, in Pakistan and Indonesia and in Korea—for years and years and years, the interests of Americans throughout this country have been in favor of their independence."

Of course it has been a "fundamental belief" of the American government that control of China by a foreign power was not in the best interests of the United States. But why? Surely there was a definable reason or reasons. The primary reasons were economic, political and military considerations.

Fearing that the European powers were on the verge of partitioning China, which would have seen this country carved up into colonies, or at best "spheres of influence," or trading preserves of the then great European colonial powers, Secretary of State John Hay acted realistically and in a manner designed to bring the best possible benefit to the United States. He called for the preservation of China as a separate entity in which *all* the foreign trading nations should have equal access to the country's markets.

Likewise, it was this disadvantage in world trade which was largely responsible for America's continual agitation against colonialism. A late-comer as a world power, it was easy for the US to adopt a holier-than-thou attitude toward the older major powers. This, of course, is not to say that the many American missionaries and others who denounced the colonial "system" were hypocrites who spoke with their tongues in their cheeks. Not at all. But the fact remains that America did not enter the world stage until almost all available colonial areas had already been grabbed by older powers.

It might also be noted that the United States frequently was able, especially in its relations with China, to ride into positions of preference on the coat-tails of the British or French, all the while denouncing them as great imperialists. This was usually accomplished via the "most favored nation" clauses in our treaties with China.

While condemning foreign exactions from the Manchu throne, it was the United States, by the treaty of Wanghsia in 1844, which established the principle of extraterritoriality on a legal or formal basis.

This recitation of past history is not meant to indicate that we think the Americans were a bunch of crooks or freebooters. We simply wish to demonstrate that the United States, like the other Western powers, was motivated in its actions in this part of the world by more basic and more easily definable things than "fundamental beliefs." or even "Christian concepts." In short, it was motivated in the formulation of its policy by what its leaders at the time considered to be the country's best and most pressing interests, be they economic, political or military.

Turning from the past to the present, Mr. Acheson disposed of communism in a swift sentence or two which defined it thusly: "Communism is the most subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy that has even been used and it is really the spearhead of Russian imperialism. . . ."

Describing the current situation in China, he says: "The attitude and interest of the Russians in North China, and in those other areas as well, long antedates communism. . . . But the communist regime has added new methods, new skills and new concepts to the thrust of Russian imperialism. This communistic concept and technique have armed Russian imperialism with a new and most insidious weapon of penetration. Armed with these new powers, what is happening in China is that the Soviet Union is detaching the northern provinces of China from China and is attaching them to the Soviet Union. This process is complete in Outer Mongolia. It is

nearly complete in Manchuria and I am sure that in Inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang there are very happy reports coming from Soviet agents to Moscow. . . ."

It is difficult to imagine how Acheson could have squeezed so much misinformation and nonsense into one paragraph. First, let us take Outer Mongolia. It is an independent country and has been so for the past quarter of a century. Even Kuomintang China finally recognized its independent status. A number of highly informative articles have appeared on this country in recent years. One, published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, was carried in the October 29, 1949, issue of the *Review*.

As for Manchuria being detached from China, nothing could be farther from the truth. Those of us living in Shanghai and eating Manchurian rice and soy beans and using Manchurian products such as iron and steel realize full well just how closely the Northeast is tied to the rest of China. A full survey of the area was carried in the January 7 issue of the *Review*.

Unfortunately, we have not had much recent news from Inner Mongolia, but what there has been has not given any indication that the area is in any danger of being grabbed by the "communist-imperialist" bogeyman which Acheson fancies he sees stretching a greedy hand across Asia. Recent developments in Sinkiang have been fully reported in the press. Needless to say, there is no indication that this province is about to be lost to China. In fact, just this past week there have been long press accounts of the taking over of military and civil affairs by the authorities from Peking.

There is no reason why Acheson should not follow the guiding principle of those earlier secretaries of state whom he is apparently so fond of referring to. They formulated American policy in an effort to look out for the best interests of the United States. That is all that is required of the present secretary. The current policy of subordinating all considerations if they conflict with the Truman administration's anti-communist hysteria is leading America straight into trouble. Every anti-communist is welcomed as a friend, regardless of whether he be murderer or crook. Even long established policies of opposing colonialism have in actual practice been jettisoned in favor of supporting "working agreements" between anti-communist native puppets and foreign colonial masters.

Today America's best interests dictate that she work with and support popular governments throughout the world. If these governments happen to be socialist regimes, that is the business of the peoples concerned.

In China there has long been a popular saying among foreign businessmen which runs to the effect that if every Chinese lengthened his shirt tail by one inch, the increased amount of business would be startling. The American government, by its continued support of the inefficient and wholly incompetent Kuomintang government, has only assured the yearly shortening of Chinese shirt tails. Now China has a government which shows every promise of at long last enabling the Chinese people not only to lengthen their shirt tails, but to buy a whole new shirt. Not to enter into friendly relations with this new government is the height of stupidity.

Somewhat similar situations exist in other parts of Asia. In Indo-China Acheson is supporting the French-Bao Dai arrangement which can only prolong the misery and degredation of the people and further increase their bitterness toward the United States. In Malaya, Acheson says, the British "are making progress." About the only progress discernable so far is the progress of Britain's war against the freedom-seeking native peoples. In Indonesia the Dutch have set up a puppet regime which has already shown itself in opposition to genuine native independence movements. In the Philippines, the US government is supporting a rotten regime which is distinguishable from the Kuomintang mainly by a matter of time.

All of this, at least so we are told, is in the interests of America's anti-communist policy. It seems to us that the time is overly ripe for a full-scale review of American policy in Asia. All things considered, self-interest is still as good a criteria as in the past. There is, we believe, no doubt but what the policy of Truman and Acheson fails this test.

25 Years Ago In *The China Weekly Review*

Militarists In Lower Yangtze

From information contained in the telegrams from Peking and Nanking, Shanghai will be the center of attacks to be made by the old opposing militarists of Kiangsu and Chekiang, and foreigners along with the Chinese will be eye witnesses and mutual losers in, what has the appearance of becoming one of the worst wars seen in China for sometime. Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan, and his accomplice General Sun Chuang-fang hold the cards in their hands as far as Shanghai is concerned and rumors are current that they control most of the towns and important districts from Shanghai to Nanking. Nanking and Peking telegrams state that General Lu Yung-Tuchun of Nanking backed by Marshal Chang Tso-lin, warlord of Manchuria, has sent his son, and troops numbering some 40,000 to march on Shanghai and Marshal Chi.

10 Years Ago In *The China Weekly Review*

Times Change

January 20, 1940

Sir Stafford Cripps, noted 'leftist' who was expelled from the British Labor Party last year for advocating a 'united front' between the Communist and Labor parties, departed from Kunming for Chungking on January 13, according to a Domei report from Hongkong which said that the labor leader was accompanied by Mr. W. H. Donald, Australian adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek.

Food Difficulties

A Reuter report from Peking on January 14 asserted that a growing shortage of cereals was creating a serious situation in North China. The shortage was due, in part, to the summer floods of last year and lack of railway freight cars for transportation, the report said, but the situation had been worsened by arbitrary price-fixing and the commandeering of stocks by the Japanese and puppet authorities.



Floating Japanese Department Store To Visit America

Japanese Revival Poses Threat

SCAP-sponsored Japanese industrial and commercial revival causes concern to "Dai Nippon's" former victims who fear a resurgent Japan, believe US policy is short-sighted.

PRESS reports from various capitals of Asia, as well as from Europe, indicate a growing opposition to America's policy of fostering the rapid reconstruction of Japan. Mainly, concern centers around two points: 1) Fear that a reconstructed and decontrolled Japan will again become a serious economic competitor in world markets; 2) Fear that such a policy will enable Japan speedily to restore her strength to the point where she may again get "out of control" and once more become a military menace to the less well-developed countries of Asia.

Under the careful guidance of General MacArthur, Japan is gradually bringing order out of the immediate post-war chaos. Bit by bit, the rigid controls previously maintained by SCAP are, in the interests of "economic self-sufficiency and stabilization," being relinquished, and more and more authority is being placed in the hands of Japanese administrators.

Proponents of US policy claim that unless Japan is allowed to "resume her normal position of leadership in Asia," the country will remain a permanent burden upon the American taxpayers who, ever since the end of the war, have been footing the bill for the annual deficit in the nation's economy.

Opponents of US policy, meanwhile, charge that while the economic situation is a genuine consideration, General MacArthur and his advisers are becoming increasingly receptive to the idea of a "stable, prosperous *and rearmed*" Japan as a bulwark against communism in the Pacific.

That the military consideration is now the preponderant factor, they say, can be seen in SCAP's growing lack of concern about prosecuting Japanese war criminals, the laxness shown by occupation officials who have allowed Japanese "volunteers" to slip off to Taiwan to aid the Kuomintang in the civil war, and the increasingly indifferent attitude of the occupation toward Japan's economic barons, the Zaibatsu.

In this connection, it is pointed out that Japanese are forbidden to leave Japan without the express permission of the occupation authorities, who are at present in control of all of Japan's relations with foreign countries. However, press reports from Tokyo have revealed that a number of former Japanese army officers have been able to "slip" away from Japan and join the Chinese Nationalist armies in Taiwan.

One such group, composed of nine men, was headed by ex-General Hiroshi Nemota, a former commander of the Japanese Army in China. Nemota and his assistants admitted upon their return that they had been aiding the Chinese Nationalists in the latter's unsuccessful attempt to hold Fukien Province against the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

The Japanese attorney-general, Mr. Shunkichi Ueda, was reported to have said that he was "studying" the matter since these officers had violated SCAP regulations by leaving Japan without permission and by participating in military affairs, which was contrary to the demilitarization directives of the Allies.

* * *

MEANWHILE Japan is gradually reentering the world scene. The accompanying photograph, from the October 5 issue of the *Seattle Times*, shows the Japanese motorship *Hikawa Maru*, which is being readied for a voyage to American ports where it will act as a floating department store, displaying silks, woolens, toys and other Japanese products. According to the *Seattle Times*, this "first step in the revival of trade between Japan and the United States" will see the *Hikawa Maru* visit Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York and Boston.

The voyage, according to the *Times*, "is a result of a suggestion to SCAP (General MacArthur) by John T. Danaher, passenger director of the American President Lines, that the Japanese be permitted to open commercial agencies in the United States prior to the signing of a peace treaty as forerunners of consular offices."

From London it is reported that the Manchester Chamber of Commerce has protested to the British government over the reappearance of Japanese textile goods in competition with similar British products in the Far East, particularly in British colonies in that area. British textile interests are reported to be particularly concerned over recent press reports of shipments of modern American textile machinery to Japan. This year, it is claimed, Japan's textile output will total about 800,000,000 yards, or approximately one-third of the pre-war figure.

From Peking the *New China News Agency*, quoting a *United Press* dispatch from Tokyo, reports that General MacArthur has granted approval for the construction of 275,000 tons of new vessels and the reconstruction of 272,000 tons of old vessels. The funds, according to the report, which amount to US$24,000,000 are being made available by the United States.

From Tokyo, it is reported that the Japanese Zaibatsu have hatched a new trade scheme which they are trying to sell to General MacArthur as a means of making Japan self-supporting. The idea envisions the formation, under American auspices, of a credit union for all Asian countries, with Japan occupying the premier position in the union. Under this suggestion, all Asian nations would pool their financial credits to finance trade between themselves. At the end of a five year period, accounts would be settled, with the debtor nations paying off the creditors either in gold or commodities.

As Asia's most industrially advanced nation, it is pointed out, Japan would by the end of five years undoubtedly be in a position to exercise what might well amount to a crippling control over the markets of the Far East.

More and Better Nurseries

This is the goal of the Shanghai Federation of Democratic Women, which is acting to expand nursery care for the children of working mothers.

ONE concrete step in promoting the welfare of women and children in Shanghai is the nursery program now underway through the auspices of the newly-formed Shanghai Federation of Democratic Women and with the cooperation of the municipal government. For the first time, day nurseries are being organized on a systematic basis to take care of the children of working mothers and enable more women to participate in productive activities.

The establishment of the first nursery in Shanghai dates as far back as 1930 but the number of nurseries in May, 1949, before the liberation of Shanghai, was only 52, including 18 in state-operated factories, 11 in privately owned factories, and 23 for children of professional and working women.

By November, 1949 Shanghai had 107 nurseries, with more being started each month.

During the KMT days, nurseries were established in the state-owned factories mainly as window-dressing and were very badly managed. Nurses generally lacked necessary training and the equipment was poor.

One of the first steps of the Shanghai Federation of Democratic Women after its inauguration was to cooperate with the Women Worker's Department of the General Labor Union in a program to improve the existing nurseries and establish new ones. Twenty-one staff workers were dispatched to various factories to look after the nursery work.

Some Unused

One staff member, for example, was sent to the No. 10 China Textile Mill, a government-owned factory, and she reported that the nursery was nothing better than a "heap of garbage" with 10 out of the total 40 beds left empty, since women workers were reluctant to send their children there. By educating the nurses and consulting with the women workers, she succeeded in expanding the nursery from the original 40 beds to 60 beds, all fully occupied. Many women workers were even willing to bring their own bedding if their children could be cared for.

In other factories of the China Textile Industries, a total of 147 beds were added. New nurseries were established in 10 additional private and government factories where 342 babies are now being cared for. On the whole, conditions for the babies have been greatly improved with cleaner surroundings and more nutritional food.

However, there are many improvements still to be made. Since the emphasis of all factories is now on increasing production, many factory owners feel that setting up nurseries is of minor importance. In those factories that do have nurseries, most of the nursery assistants have had no training and receive little pay, and in many factories one assistant has to take care of from 10 to as many as 27 babies.

The Shanghai Federation of Democratic Women is tackling these problems by first educating the present nursery assistants and then training new ones to help with the increased load. A training class has been set up. Fifty trainees attended class from August 1 to October 1 and another class has been organized with 40 additional trainees.

Government office nurseries were established after the liberation of the city for children of women government employees in nine offices, with three more soon to be officially opened. The nine now in operation have at present a total of 376 children whose ages range from one and one-half years to six years. The necessary funds to run the nursery are allocated by the government office.

The private nurseries come under two categories: Those run by such well-known agencies as the YWCA, the China Welfare Fund and other welfare organizations; and those run for profit by various individuals. As late as 1945 there was only one private nursery to take care of children of professional women, laborers or peasants. At present there are 39 caring for 1,359 children, mostly of ages between 1½ and 6. The charges range from three to four *tou* of rice (or 20 to 25 parity units) for all day care and six to eight *tou* of rice (or 40 to 50 parity units) for 24-hour care. Ninety percent of the children attend only in the day. On the average, one nurse takes care of from 5 to 10 children.

The private nurseries also have many problems to face. A few that are run only as a means of earning money for some individual or group often lack democratic principles of open discussion and meetings of self-criticism in which all the workers can improve their work. For most of the nurseries the working hours are too long with low pay, and often the standard of the workers is very low.

In order to aid the privately run nurseries, the Bureaus of Public Health and Civil Affairs recently promulgated a set of regulations governing the operation of nurseries and promised financial assistance to those that are well-managed. Encouragement is also given to private quarters to open more nurseries.

Six nurseries in rural areas outside of Shanghai were established before the liberation of the city. These nurseries are now receiving necessary financial assistance from the municipal authorities. Each nursery is entitled to receive rice, milk powder and cod liver oil for the children under its care.

A resolution was passed at the recently held Shanghai Women's Delegates' Conference calling for the promotion of nursery work in the surrounding areas as a step in aiding the production program.

Many of the nurseries under the welfare organizations and those set up for children of government women workers have attained a high standard. For example the China Welfare Fund's first nursery now has 39 children with 11 staff members to take care of them. In addition, they are carrying on a training program in cooperation with the Women's Federation to provide staff members for new nurseries.

So far Shanghai has seen a remarkable expansion of a very necessary program to make it possible for women to contribute their share in the production effort. But this is only the beginning, according to the program of the Women's Federation. Future plans call for setting up a model nursery, enlarging some of the nurseries by aiding them with equipment and other supplies so that more youngsters can be accommodated, and setting up a minimum standard for all nurseries to follow.

These two photos, taken at the China Welfare Fund's First Children's Nursery in Shanghai, show workers' children playing and studying.

China's Protestant Program

Church and mission work continues with liberation, situation in cities practically normal while rural areas report sharp decline particularly in Northeast and North China.

IN reviewing the condition of Protestant churches and mission schools and hospitals since liberation, it is noteworthy that as liberation became easier, particularly with the collapse of Kuomintang resistance dating from the crossing of the Yangtze, Protestant churches and mission projects have reported smoother adjustments than during earlier liberations when the intensity of military activity was greater. Difficulties there have been even in 1949 but for the most part these have been on a local level with negotiations and discussions between church representatives and the local authorities leading in many cases to a satisfactory settlement. At no time in 1949 have any of the earlier difficulties which the church and mission groups reported in Shantung in 1947 recurred.

Religious Freedom

With the inclusion of freedom of religious belief in Chapter One—General Principles, Article 5 of the Common Program, the Central People's Government has undertaken to support the policy of freedom of religious belief. Many church leaders, both Chinese and foreign, attribute whatever difficulties church and mission groups have had during 1949 as due to misunderstandings and divergencies from policy by local authorities, a situation which they say may be unavoidable during a period of military control. They emphasize the fact that present-day difficulties do not spring from any overall policy aimed at religious persecution and point to the inclusion of five Protestant leaders in the Religious Delegation to the PPCC as a sign of the government's interest in religious groups working for the welfare of the nation.

A church bulletin summarizing the events of 1949 as they affected church and mission work said in part:

"The church in north China has suffered greater loss in property and personnel than in newly liberated areas. Medical work has generally been permitted to continue. Christian schools are carrying on under the new government with some restrictions. Most seminaries and Bible schools are still open. City churches have suffered less than rural churches. In general churches are going ahead with their usual worship services, preaching and service activities, although in some regions borrowing of church buildings and various restrictions have created problems. The government policy appears to be religious freedom and also freedom for opposition to religion. Some attacks have been made upon the foreign origin and connections of Chinese churches and Christian institutions. On the whole the situation is more favorable for Christian work than had been expected...

"If this mighty social revolution can spur the church to greater self-support, to more devoted service, to a deeper concern for the industrial and farming classes, and to a truer and braver Christian witness, we can be grateful...It is certainly not a time for discouragement or defeatism."

On the "borrowing" of church property which has been the chief source of friction between Protestant leaders and the local government officials, it is pointed out that very often, particularly in isolated rural areas, the only good building in the village or town would be the church and the church residence. As the PLA advanced, it needed buildings to hold public meetings, accommodate soldiers, civil administrators and to serve as granaries for foodstocks; it would see a building, frequently the only building of any size in the town, used only two hours a day on Sunday and it would ask to "borrow" the building temporarily, explaining that the present use of the building for only a few hours each week was uneconomical. Church leaders have in many cases interpreted such action as confiscation rather than borrowing.

In Shensi, where a number of mission buildings were borrowed last August to serve as military hospitals, when the KMT resistance in the area collapsed and no fighting was necessary, the buildings were returned to their owners. Even when the churches are "borrowed," however, it is reported that in many cases church services may be held on Sundays, and the soldiers are said to be taught to respect the articles of religion.

Rural Churches Decline

While few generalizations are possible from the data on hand with regard to the present condition of Protestant work, for reports are still too fragmentary as to what has actually happened in many areas and contradictory reports are made, it seems clear that while city churches have carried on without interference, rural churches have suffered considerable losses in terms of the number of churches which have closed. Although most of the statistics available refer chiefly to areas liberated several years ago rather than more recently, surveys made of rural work in North and Northeast China within the past six months indicate that between 70 and 80 percent of the rural churches in those areas have closed.

Before the Sino-Japanese war, the Church of Christ in China, for example, which was the major church in the Northeast had 290 churches throughout the area. Now it has only 47 churches functioning in the Northeast and these are mainly in the cities; almost all the rural churches in the Northeast have ceased functioning.

The question is naturally asked, why did rural churches and church work in general suffer so seriously in the Northeast? There were a number of reasons: first, some church buildings, schools, and hospitals were completely destroyed during the Japanese war and later during the civil war; second, before the approach of the People's Liberation Army, a number of Chinese pastors and church leaders fled, leaving their posts without leadership, with the result that many of the churches and institutions automatically closed. Once closed, it was extremely difficult for the church leaders to try to return and reopen their churches and institutions for they were regarded with suspicion. Third, misunderstandings between local church people and local authorities resulted in a number of cases of rural churches being suspended or closed completely. Chinese church leaders who have made a study of this situation say that the cadres assigned to the rural areas have in general been less well informed than those who entered the cities. These cadres were sometimes reported to make little distinction between the various churches regarding all religious work including Protestant churches and mission projects and superstitious non-Christian sects as one and the same type of exploiters of the common people. They showed little appreciation for the welfare aspects of some of the Protestant programs.

One of the most interesting facts to emerge from this recent survey of the condition of the churches in the Northeast is that everyone of those 47 churches which are still operating is self-supporting for the first time. They have had to become so as funds from abroad were unobtainable once they were cut off from headquarters offices in Shanghai. Church pastors and personnel associated with these 47 churches realized that if foreign subsidies continued as their chief support, this would not help their position with the local authorities who were already suspicious of their foreign connections. Pastors started to engage in farming, raising bees, doing handicraft work in order to become fully or partially self-supporting, aided by contributions from their congregations. Many Chinese church leaders feel that in spite of the decline in numbers, the churches continuing in the Northeast are in a stronger position than ever before.

Overall Picture

In the Northwest, in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu, Protestant work is functioning practically as normal. Reports state that foreign missionaries are able to travel provided they keep to places along the railways and main highways. An evangelical team of the China

Inland Mission has proceeded from Lanchow to Sian without any difficulty. Kwangtung reports indicate that mission work in south China is practically normal, that most missionaries were staying on their jobs, that "there has been no pressure for alteration of curriculum and no demand for the rejection of Christianity in education." Along the coast, particularly near and in Ningpo, church groups have suffered property damage as a result of KMT bombings.

Central China Survey

IN December, 1949 a five-man team of Chinese Christian leaders completed a one-month survey of Protestant work in central and east China. Among the cities visited were Hangchow, Nanchang, Changsha, Hankow, Wuchang and Kaifeng. Everywhere they went, the team had a most cordial welcome. Two of the members had participated in the PPCC and explained the government's policy to the Christian groups and at the same time explained the problems of the Christian groups to the local government officials. As a result of the survey trip, one spokesman for the group said that he believed that the trip had been very successful, that there had been a frank exchange of problems on both sides (between the Chinese Christian groups and the authorities), and though there might be difficulties in the future, he believed that a sound basis had been laid for the full implementation of the policy of religious freedom as established in the Common Program. This Christian leader said that he was most impressed with the sincerity and non-bureaucratic attitude of top officials in discussions.

As a result of the investigations of this team a number of conclusions were reached with regard to Protestant work in the Central China area. The Chinese Church wants to be indigenous and self-supporting. Chinese church leaders believe that the time has come for the Chinese to assume leadership in church affairs instead of foreign missionaries. There are still cases where missionaries, if not in name, at least in fact, occupy leading positions in church and mission projects. In some cases Chinese Christian leaders believe that the presence of the foreign missionary is actually a handicap for the foreign missionary finds it difficult to have any contact with Chinese groups outside of the church. Chinese church leaders believe that in the future foreign missionaries should come to China only as associates and advisers, and state that those with technical skills would be more useful than those without such skills.

Finances Still A Problem

While Chinese church leaders are anxious for the Chinese church to become indigenous, they recognize the fact that finances are still a problem and that there is no quick method for solving this problem. In the Central China area, there has been much talk about encouraging church leaders to enter productive fields, but these plans are mostly paper ideas as yet.

Another point which was stressed in discussions with the Protestant groups was that in the future Christian organizations should concern themselves more than ever with projects which benefit the common people. There is also need for unity among the various sects—unity on a city and provincial level and later on a national level. Many Christian leaders in the Central China area expressed the view that the denominational distinctions from the West prove a handicap in China, that these distinctions do not always have meaning for Christians in China. They felt that the growing unity between the different religions was a healthy development which should be encouraged. In this connection it is of interest to note that in Changsha the visiting team was entertained not only by Protestant groups but also by Mohammedans, Buddhists, and Catholics.

In all discussions the team was greatly impressed with the sympathetic hearings which they received from top government officials; they did meet minor government officials who were prejudiced against church groups largely on account of the foreign ties which church and mission projects have had. In the minds of these officials the church and mission projects were closely linked with foreign imperialism and this explanation is given for their prejudices against the Christian program. However, as an instance of the sincerity of top officials in implementing the policy of freedom of religious belief and of the type of difficulty which church groups sometimes encounter, this story was cited.

Officials Cooperative

A Christian girls school in Kiukiang was asked to evacuate its building by the local government officials who said that since the school had so few students, it should join with the boys school in the community and allow the government the use of their property. This story was told to the governor of the province by the visiting team. The governor telephoned the mayor of Kiukiang immediately and gave instructions that such a step should not be taken without orders from the provincial government. The situation was quickly solved and the girls school is continuing in its own building.

In Honan, which has long been a center of war and a backward province socially (many superstitious non-Christian sects have operated there), the team reported a most successful visit in this trouble-spot area. The Christian groups in Honan had been very eager for the visit for they had had no contact with government officials. As a result of the team's talks with the Christian groups and the government authorities, the mayor of Kaifeng called together a group of 10 or 12 Christian representatives together with some 20 to 30 top-ranking officials for a round-table conference on their common problems. There was a frank exchange and in the discussions on the prejudiced attitude of some of the cadres towards church groups, the mayor explained the reason for this attitude, which leads sometimes to such difficulties as confiscation of church property. He explained that the Christian groups in many places are prejudiced against the new ideas and in Kaifeng the local authorities had actually found reactionary slogans posted up in church property. The mayor produced photostated evidence.

As a result of the round-table conference, word has been received in Shanghai very recently that the Christian groups in Kaifeng have received an invitation to participate in the next conference of the People's Representatives to be held in Kaifeng.

13 Colleges Operating

While all of the 13 Christian Colleges (Protestant) are functioning, many have reported greatly reduced enrolments. For example, at Ginling College in Nanking the enrolment has dropped from 400 to 160 for the autumn term of 1949. This has been due largely to the fact that many of the students have joined the government's foreign language school or entered other special training courses which the government has established for the training of future administrators. The 236 mission schools (middle schools) scattered throughout China have had some difficulties on the question of religious education. Many of the schools in the belief that a ban on religious education will come sooner or later—have dropped the subject. Others who interpret the regulations to mean no religious education on the school grounds are holding classes voluntarily in mission residences.

Although many Chinese church leaders feel optimistic about the future contribution of Protestant churches and projects, they point out that in the future the contribution may be of a somewhat different nature. There will be a far greater emphasis on production in all projects and on self-support for Chinese pastors and church workers. They believe that if church and mission projects in all their various phases can succeed in reaching and serving the common people, they will have no difficulties for if their programs are of benefit to the common people, their support will be assured.

Position Of Foreigners

Many foreign missionaries still in China feel pessimistic about the future position and contribution of foreign missionaries but hopeful about the development of the Chinese church. The major difficulty which the foreign missionaries report as far as they are concerned is the restriction on travel which they say makes it impossible for them to attend meetings or inspect church work, and prevents them from keeping in touch with various parts of their program.

Another problem which they report is the question of land taxes on church and mission property which a few have protested vehemently, stating that schools and hospitals are for the people and should be tax-free. However, many missionaries stated that upon application to the authorities for land tax reductions, they were successful in reducing taxes on hospitals and schools by 50 percent; in some cases, a small reduction was made on the taxes for missionary residences. Cases of total exemption of taxes for hospitals and schools have been reported wherever the local authorities have judged the

contribution of the project concerned to be of such real service to the community as to warrant this exemption.

In Sian, for example, a large hospital of 100 beds, noted for the high proportion of charity cases it has taken over the years, and supported by the English Baptists was totally exempted from land tax. This hospital made its services available to local PLA personnel for medical treatment after liberation. Together with the local church in Sian it has recently established three rural clinics on the outskirts of the city and plans to establish more as soon as additional personnel have been trained.

Other examples of special treatment with regard to land tax are the cases of the YMCA and YWCA in Shanghai which because of their unique social contributions among the poorer classes have received special privileges with regard to land tax reductions.

What the missionaries predict as a ban on religious education in the middle schools is another problem which worries a number of them. They point out that this may be a setback in the long run to the propagation of Christianity, for students are less inclined to take voluntary courses in universities in the study of religion if they have had no previous training.

Finances and Personnel

While the reports from American mission boards indicate no drop in contributions since China's change of government, and in some denominations even an increase, the British picture is likely to be quite different according to reports received in Shanghai. The drop in British contributions is anticipated not as a result of the changes within China but as a direct result of the devaluation of the pound and the subsequent increased cost of living for small British contributors. Apparently this has already been felt in England, and British mission boards in Shanghai are facing the possibility of curtailing their work, which will probably take the direction of no replacements for work temporarily suspended as a result of war conditions, and encouragement of Chinese efforts for support of church and church institution work.

Overseas Funds

Accurate up-to-date figures on financial support from abroad are difficult to obtain. However, in 1932 American Protestant property holdings in China were valued at US$70,000,000. While mission property suffered some destruction during the Sino-Japanese war, substantial grants running into millions after V-J day for the replacement of lost and damaged property and equipment have brought the value of Protestant mission assets at least as high as they were then. In 1932 American Protestant missions reported that they were receiving US$10,000,000 annually from the United States alone for the support of Protestant mission work. Present day estimates place the overall support for Protestant mission work in China from all countries (chiefly the United States, Great Britain and Canada) as approximately US$10,000,000 a year.

In a message to mission boards abroad a varied group of 21 Chinese church leaders discussed the question of financial support: "Regarding financial support, there is nothing in principle that prevents its continuance. It is understood that mission funds are still welcome provided no strings are attached. It is to be stressed here, however, that such financial support should be regarded as temporary in nature, and it is the duty of the Chinese church to build up its own support as soon as circumstances permit. An understanding needs to be reached between the Chinese church and the mission boards concerned, based upon the principle of self-support on the one hand, and a realistic evaluation of the problem on the other...."

Unofficial and informal reports from Peking indicate that the attitude of the authorities of the Central People's Government toward the problem of the Chinese church receiving grants from the United States, Canada and Great Britain is to allow the continuance of such grants provided the money contributed is from the people and not from any government source, that the money is used for projects rather than for the salaries of Chinese church workers and that the money has no strings whatsoever attached to it. Chinese church leaders have been worried as to whether continued financial support from the US, Canada and Great Britain, which they feel is still necessary, would be misunderstood. Informal talks between church leaders and the authorities in Peking have indicated that if the Chinese church can comply with the two conditions specified, it will have no difficulty with regard to the use of foreign funds.

In this connection, a recent report from the North China Synod of the Church of Christ in China notifying the foreign missionary boards participating in its program of a decision that for the coming year no Chinese pastor or church worker in that area would be paid from foreign funds is significant.

Ties With Missions

With regard to the question of foreign personnel, the attitude of government officials, again as explained in informal and unofficial talks with Chinese church leaders, seems to be: 1) foreigners should not occupy administrative positions in any part of the church program or in the institutions supported by the churches; 2) because of the country's needs the people's government prefers foreign workers in the fields of medicine and the technical sciences rather than evangelists.

On the points of finance and foreign personnel Chinese church groups are closely linked with foreign missionary boards. While the transfer of administrative responsibilities from foreign to Chinese hands has been speeded up, particularly since liberation, the transference of financial assets has not been nearly so rapid. Various reasons are given for this—that the Chinese church bodies cannot afford to pay for the maintenance of mission properties, and that there is more "protection" for the property so long as it remains in foreign hands.

An interesting development with regard to the transference of administrative responsibility is the recent decision of the American Episcopal Board in the United States to withdraw all Episcopal bishops from China and turn the responsibilities which these bishops carry at present over to Chinese church leaders.

With the functioning of the Bureau of Religious Affairs set up under the

—Sidewalk Library, by Shih Tse-chi.

Department of the Interior by the Central People's Government (this bureau will deal with the problems of all religious groups—Mohammedans, Buddhists and Christians), many Chinese and foreign church leaders believe that difficulties encountered on a local level will be smoothed out and greater harmony will be established between the Protestant church groups and the government authorities. Already on a local level reports have come from Chuhsien (Anhwei) and Hofei (Anhwei) that the Protestant pastors in these two localities have been invited to participate in the local people's councils. In Shantung in November 1949 arrangements were made at the Shantung Synod of the Church of Christ in China for the Christian churches to have representatives at the various peoples' public meetings with the representatives to be chosen by the local Christian councils.

Many Chinese church leaders point to these developments and say that Protestant Christianity, which numerically represents the smallest of the organized religious groups in China, and today claims a membership of between 600,000 and 1,000,000 adult communicants, will be able to make a successful adjustment to the new environment.

— ROSE YARDUMIAN

Stalin And The Chinese Revolution

Chen Po-ta

(There has been a great deal of interest in the relationship between China and the Soviet Union, and between Mao Tze-tung and Joseph Stalin. This is the subject dealt with in the following article by Chen Po-ta, well-known writer and vice-head of the Information Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, written on the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday. In it, he quotes from Stalin's writings on the Chinese Revolution, describes how Mao Tze-tung independently arrived at the same conclusions, and discusses the importance attached by the Chinese Communist Party to the Stalin-Mao Tze-tung approach.—Editor)

I

At the meeting in Yenan celebrating the 60th birthday of Stalin, Comrade Mao Tze-tung said: "Stalin is the leader of the world revolution. This is a matter of paramount importance. It is a great event that mankind has Stalin. Since we have him, things can go well. As you all know, Marx is dead and so are Engels and Lenin. Had there been no Stalin, who would there be to give directions? But having him —this is really a fortunate event. Now there exist in the world a Soviet Union, a Communist Party, and a Stalin. Thus, the affairs of the world can go well."

Comrade Mao Tze-tung pointed out to the comrades of our Chinese Party: "We must hail him, support him, and learn from him. We must learn from him in two respects: his theory and his work."

Comrade Mao Tze-tung explained Stalin's merits in developing Marxism-Leninism. He explained that Stalin's guidance in completing the Socialist construction in the Soviet Union was "a matter of monumental significance." He explained that Stalin has assisted the Chinese people's cause with both theory and material aid. Comrade Mao Tze-tung said: "In the past, Marxism-Leninism gave theoretical guidance to the world revolution. Now something has been added, namely, material aid can be given to the world revolution. This is to Stalin's great credit."

Another 10 years have elapsed and we are now celebrating Comrade Stalin's 70th birthday. This occasion takes place after mankind has undergone the Second World War and the people of the world, headed by the Soviet Union, have defeated the three fascist imperialist countries, Germany, Italy and Japan. It occurs after the emergence in the world of many new People's Democracies. It occurs after the Chinese people have defeated Japanese imperialism, following which they proceeded to overthrow the counter-revolutionary rule of the Kuomintang and to oust the invading forces of American imperialism, thereby attaining the establishment of the People's Republic of China. It occurs at a time when the Soviet Union has become incomparably strong in the world while the world imperialist system, headed by American imperialism, is tottering. The series of great historic events which took place during the past 10 years cannot be separated from Stalin's name. Neither can they be separated from Stalin's work or from Stalin's assistance to the people of every country. These historic events of the world in the past 10 years have further proved that Stalin is not only the Soviet people's banner of victory but also that of all progressive humanity in the world. They have also provided further proof of what Comrade Mao Tze-tung pointed out 10 years ago: "Stalin is the leader of the world revolution. This is a matter of paramount importance. It is indeed a great event that mankind has Stalin. Since we have him, things can go well." That the world has a Stalin "is a really fortunate event."

Stalin's birthday is a "day of mankind" for the world. That the Chinese people can, together with the Soviet people and the whole of progressive humanity throughout the world, celebrate the 70th birthday of this greatest figure in the world, this teacher of genius, whose relations have been the most universal and whose accomplishments have been the most extensive in the cause of mankind's liberation since Marx, Engels and Lenin, is, in itself, their good fortune. This celebration is a salute to the liberation of mankind and to the hope and future of humanity.

But we Chinese people have special reasons for hailing Stalin. They are: Stalin's close relationship with the Chinese revolution, his concern over the fate of the Chinese people, and his great theoretical contributions to the questions of the Chinese revolution.

II

ON the basis of a concrete analysis of the concrete conditions of Chinese society, Stalin, this great scientist of dialectical materialism, the teacher of world revolution, formulated at the time of the First Great Revolution of China, a series of questions concerning the Chinese revolution, to which he offered extremely brilliant solutions. By this means he demolished the nonsense on the questions of China advanced by the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites and assisted the Communist Party of China to embark on the path of Bolshevism. Stalin's many writings on China during this period are models in the integration of revolutionary theory with revolutionary practice; they constitute an important portion of the treasury of Marxist-Leninist theory concerning the fate of mankind. They were not only correct at that time, but have been proved completely correct by the practice of the Chinese revolution during the last 20 odd years.

When the revolutionary rays of the Chinese people were just appearing, Stalin had already seen that China's revolution contained unlimited force. Recently Malenkov, in a report commemorating the October Revolution, made a point of recalling a forecast Stalin had made as far back as 1925.

"The forces of the revolutionary movement in China are incalculable. They have not yet made themselves properly felt. But they will make themselves felt in the future. The rulers of the East and of the West who do not see these forces and do not reckon with them in due measure will suffer from this." This forecast of Stalin was based on an appraisal of the political, economic and other conditions of China, and on the alignment of forces within Chinese society. It was also based on an appraisal of the political, economic and other conditions of the world and the alignment of the various forces of the world.

In regard to China, Stalin made the following important appraisal in November, 1926, when he wrote on the perspectives of the Chinese revolution: "The role of initiator and leader of the Chinese revolution, the role of the leader of the Chinese peasantry will inevitably fall to the Chinese proletariat and its party." This appraisal by Stalin was made in relation to the weakness of the national bourgeoisie of China. It is an appraisal of utmost importance. Because if the Chinese proletariat could assume the leadership of the Chinese revolution, then Chinese peasants and all the other popular masses could develop to the fullest their revolutionary force under the leadership of the Chinese proletariat. And once this is achieved by the people of this country, who comprise almost one quarter of the world's population, the world is bound to change its face.

As to the world, obviously enough, Stalin proceeded from the famous law discovered by Lenin regarding the uneven political and economic development of capitalist countries as well as the exceptional sharpening of their contradictions in the era of imperialism. From this he predicted

that the Chinese revolution had the possibility, in the wake of the Russian October Revolution, of continuing to breach the imperialist front in the East. Stalin also proceeded from the fact of the Soviet Union's existence and might. As he pointed out in his "On the Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution:" "Side by side with China there exists and develops the Soviet Union, whose revolutionary experiences and assistance cannot but facilitate the struggles of the Chinese proletariat against imperialism and against the medieval feudal remnants in China."

Because Stalin's forecast proceeded from a firm scientific foundation, he saw the extraordinarily profound character of the struggle of the Chinese people. Therefore, at all times of the Chinese revolution and no matter how grave the setbacks suffered by it, he was convinced that it would eventually advance and obtain victory.

After Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution in 1927, Stalin refuted the Trotskyite clique for their nonsensical talk of muddling up the Chinese revolution with Turkey's "Kemalist form of revolution." Stalin analyzed the differences between China and Turkey and maintained that the possibility of a "Kemalist form of revolution" did not exist in China. Stalin said:

"In China, imperialism has to beat the living body of national China, hacking it into small pieces and wresting away entire provinces in order to maintain its old positions or at least a part of them."

"Hence though in Turkey the struggle against imperialism can end with the unfinished anti-imperialist revolution of the Kemalists, in China it must adopt a profoundly popular and clearly national character and must extend step by step until it reaches a desperate battle with imperialism shaking the very foundation of imperialism throughout the world." (Stalin: Talk with students of Sun Yat-sen University).

Stalin also pointed out: "In China, either Chinese Mussolinis like Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang will win and thereafter be overthrown by the upswing of the agrarian revolution, or Wuhan will win (referring to the revolutionary Wuhan of the time: Chen Po-ta). Chiang Kai-shek and his followers, in trying to find a middle road between these two camps, must inevitably collapse, sharing the fate of Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang." (Stalin: Talk with students of Sun Yat-sen University).

When Wang Ching-wei, following the steps of Chiang Kai-shek, also betrayed the revolution, Stalin continued to refute the Trotskyite clique for their rantings about the bankruptcy of the Chinese revolution. He affirmed that there was no possibility for reformism to exist in China. Stalin said:

"Among the old and new militarists themselves war has broken out afresh and this cannot but weaken the power of counter-revolution, ruin and embitter the peasantry."

"In China there is not yet any group or government capable of carrying out reforms similar to Stolypin's which will serve as a lightning conductor for the ruling group."

"It is not easy to bridle and suppress the millions of peasants who have taken possession of the land of the landlords." "The prestige of the proletariat among the working masses is rising from day to day and its strength is far from being destroyed." (Stalin: Comment on current affairs: On China).

The development of events is the touchstone of predictions.

Since 1927, a series of events have occurred in China: Chiang Kai-shek became the Mussolini of China and replaced Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang; unending wars took place between the new and old Kuomintang warlords; the Chinese agrarian revolution grew to an upsurge; all attempts at "reformism" on the part of the Kuomintang counter-revolutionary regime went bankrupt; China was carved up, first by the Japanese imperialists, then by the American imperialists; the Chinese people undertook a life-and-death struggle against Japanese and American imperialism; these struggles shook the foundation of the imperialists all over the world; Chiang Kai-shek met with the same fate as Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang and has fallen from the counter-revolutionary political stage. . . . This series of events completely bore out the predictions Stalin made over 20 years ago.

Stalin's predictions have encouraged the Chinese people during their struggle over these 20-odd years. They have clearly shown that revolutionary science is an irresistible force. At the same time, they exposed the shameless way the Trotskyites and other counter-revolutionary clowns were boosting Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei.

III

IN May, 1927, Stalin made the following generalization regarding the question of the nature of the Chinese revolution: "The present-day Chinese revolution is a confluence of two currents of revolutionary movements—the movement against the feudal survivals and that against imperialism. The Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution is the confluence of the struggle against feudal survivals and the struggle against imperialism." (Stalin: Chinese Revolution and the Tasks of the Communist International).

This was a conclusion Stalin reached through his penetrating analysis of Chinese society. This was a conclusion having very great historical significance in regard to the questions of the Chinese revolution. As Stalin pointed out: "Such is the starting point of the whole line of the Comintern on the questions of the Chinese revolution" at that time.

The Trotskyites were just then opposing this line. They thought China's question in relation to foreign countries was merely the customs question, thus negating the anti-imperialist nature of the Chinese revolution. They denied the preponderant influence of the Chinese feudal remnants, thereby negating the anti-feudal nature of the Chinese revolution.

Stalin pointed out that the viewpoint held by Trotsky and his underlings was the counter-revolutionary viewpoint of Chang Tso-lin and Chiang Kai-shek. As everyone knows, it was precisely because the Chinese Trotskyites based themselves on the whole of Trotsky's counter-revolutionary views and at the same time on these counter-revolutionary views of Trotsky's in regard to China that they took the road of counter-revolution together with the Trotskyites in other countries.

Stalin said, "The bourgeois democratic revolution in China is directed not only against feudal remnants. It is at the same time directed against imperialism." (Stalin: Chinese Revolution and the Tasks of the Communist International).

Only when this nature of the revolution has been determined on the basis of China's social conditions can our Party correctly appraise the concrete changes in class relations under any concrete historical situation, so as to determine the specific tasks of the revolution to organize the revolutionary front, to lead the revolution forward, and to create the possibility for the Chinese revolution to grow, under the leadership of the Chinese working class, from a bourgeois democratic revolution into a Socialist one.

The Chen Tu-hsiu opportunism of 1927 precisely opposed this dialectical analysis by Stalin. The Chen Tu-hsiu opportunism later merged with counter-revolutionary Trotskyism; this point is known to everyone and will not be dwelt on further.

It should be pointed out here that during the 20-odd years since 1927, the errors of either right or "left" opportunism which occurred within our Party were usually, in the first place, violations of this dialectical analysis by Stalin regarding the nature of the revolution by either overlooking the anti-imperialist or the anti-feudal aspect.

For instance, during the 10-year Civil War period, the comrades who committed mistakes of "left" opportunism had long overlooked the anti-imperialist aspect. They neglected what Stalin had pointed out, "The bourgeois democratic Chinese revolution is characterized by the sharpening of struggle against imperialism." (Stalin: Chinese Revolution and Tasks of the Communist International).

Therefore, they were not adept in utilizing the situation to organize an anti-imperialist front correctly, in order to coordinate with the struggles of the agrarian revolution and overcome their isolation. During this period, they also prematurely advocated the adventurous carrying out of "the transformation into a Socialist revolution."

To cite another example: During the anti-Japanese war those comrades who had earlier committed the error of "left" opportunism swung over to the error of right opportunism. Their views were exactly like those of the 1927 Chen Tu-hsiu opportunism in that they overlooked the aspect of opposing feudalism. They "saw only the bourgeoisie" and "failed to see the decisive significance of the Chinese agrarian revolutionary movement." They "did not agree to give free rein to the revolution in the countryside fearing that, by having the peasantry drawn into the revolution, the united anti-imperialist front would be broken."

Such erroneous views, of course, were in direct opposition to those of Stalin. Because, according to Stalin, "the anti-imperialist united front in China will be all the stronger and more powerful the sooner and more thoroughly the Chinese peasantry is drawn into the revolution." (On the Perspectives of Chinese Revolution).

Since this kind of rightist opportunists in this period denied the anti-feudal aspect, they therefore also advocated, just as the Chen Tu-hsiu opportunism did in 1927, discarding the leadership of the proletariat. They saw only a future for the bourgeoisie and failed to see the future for the people's revolutionary victory and Socialism.

It is very clear that the question of the nature of the Chinese revolution is interrelated with the question of concrete tactics at each stage of this revolution.

Anyone who commits mistakes regarding the nature of the revolution is bound to commit mistakes regarding concrete revolutionary tactics.

In refuting the nonsensical talk of the Trotskyites on the China question, Stalin especially set forth clearly the main tactical principles of Leninism.

"1) The principle of the necessity of taking into account the national peculiarities and the national characteristics of each nation while working out the guiding instructions of the Comintern for the workers' movement of that nation.

"2) The principle of the necessity for the Communist Party in every country of utilizing the smallest possibilities of securing mass allies for the proletariat, even if they are temporary, vacillating, wavering or unreliable.

"3) The principle of the necessity of taking into account the truth that propaganda and agitation alone are not enough for the political

education of millions of the masses, but that this demands the political experience of the masses themselves." (Stalin: Comment on current affairs: On China).

Stalin then went on to emphasize the question of combining general Marxist-Leninist principles with national characteristics. He wrote:

"Notwithstanding the ideological growth of our Party, it unfortunately contains certain types of 'leaders' who sincerely believe that it is possible to direct the revolution in China, so to speak, by telegraph on the basis of the well-known universally acknowledged general principles of the Comintern and who do not consider the national peculiarities of Chinese economics, Chinese politics, Chinese culture, Chinese customs and traditions. These leaders are distinguished from the real leaders by the fact that they always have in their pockets two or three ready-made formulas which are suitable for all countries and 'obligatory' under all conditions. For them there is no problem of taking into account the national character and national peculiarities of each country. For them there is no problem of linking the general principles of the Comintern with the national peculiarities of the revolutionary movement in each country, no problem of adapting the general principles of the Comintern to the national state peculiarities of each country.

"They do not understand that the main task of leadership at the present time, when Communist Parties have already grown up and become mass parties, consists of finding out, mastering and skilfully combining the national peculiarities of the revolutionary movement in each country with the general principles of the Comintern in order to further and carry out in practice the basic objectives of the Communist movement.

"From this there comes the attempt to stereotype the leadership for all countries. From this there comes the attempt mechanically to apply certain general formulas regardless of the concrete conditions of the revolutionary movement in each country. From this there comes the endless conflict between formulas and the revolutionary movement in each country, which is the essential outcome of the leadership of these unfortunate leaders." (Ibid).

Stalin particularly took up the question of the nature of the Chinese revolution to explain the question of tactics in this revolution, and in this way he refuted the Trotskyite nonsense about the nature as well as tactics of the Chinese revolution. Stalin linked up the question of the nature of the Chinese revolution with that of its tactics, pointing out and generalizing the national peculiarities of this revolution.

Stalin's view expounded here is, to use Comrade Mao Tze-tung's words, that of the union of the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.

Since 1927, the errors of the dogmatists in our Party, who are also the "left" or right opportunists, consisted precisely in forgetting the lessons contained in Stalin's refutation of the Trotskyites. They thought that to lead the Chinese revolution, it was enough to have only two or three ready-made formulas in their pockets which were "suitable" for every country and "obligatory" under any conditions. For them, consideration of China's national peculiarities or national characteristics did not exist. Therefore endless conflicts arose between their numerous mechanically applied formulas and the concrete revolution in China.

Our dogmatists confined themselves to abstract formulas and simple historical analogies, and they did not start from the concrete situation in China. Hence, on the question of the nature of the Chinese revolution, they at one time or another inevitably committed one error or another. Also for this reason, they could not combine principles with flexibility in accordance with changes in the concrete situation. In order to defeat a powerful enemy, they could not carry out what Stalin had said: "It is necessary to have a flexible and well-considered policy of the proletariat and to be skillful in utilizing every fissure in the camp of the enemy and in finding allies for oneself." (Stalin: Comment on current affairs: On China).

During the 10-year Civil War, our dogmatists advocated the overthrow of all, or as Comrade Mao Tze-tung has ridiculed them: "You cannot overthrow those in power, so you want to overthrow those who are not in power. They are already not in power, yet you still want to overthrow them."

But, in another historical situation, for instance in that of the anti-Japanese war, they swung over to advocating uniting with all, denying that there are three groups—left, center and right—inside the anti-Japanese united front and denying that there must be a difference in our Party's tactics toward these three groups. Also for this reason, they could not establish real connections with the masses in line with concrete conditions, but instead in succession enforced the compulsory carrying out of orders by the masses. Stalin has said: "It is necessary for the masses to recognize through their own experiences the unreliability and the reactionary and counter-revolutionary nature of the Kuomintang leadership." But our dogmatists forgot the teachings of Stalin and thought that, if only a few "leaders" understood things, they could issue orders which the masses would follow. Stalin said, "Revolution is conducted not only by the advanced group, not only by the party, not only by individuals even if they are 'great men,' but above all and fundamentally by the millions of the masses of the people."

But our dogmatists forgot the teachings of Stalin and believed that the revolution could above all and fundamentally be conducted by these few dogmatists, the self-styled "leading figures."

The events in China during the past 30 years have demonstrated the extremely complicated and tortuous character of the Chinese revolution. They also show that it was the complex and devious interlocking of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggles in particular which gave rise to these characteristics. These factors thus gave rise to a series of questions of revolutionary tactics, of a united front and the relationship between the revolution in urban and rural areas. At the same time they also gave rise to the question of vital strategy in the military struggle.

Just as Stalin said, "In China armed revolution opposes armed counter-revolution." What areas then should be the key points of attack in the armed struggles at different times? During offensives are there still defensive actions or retreats? How should the offensive and defensive or retreat be interlinked? How should the defensive or retreat be changed into the offensive? Everyone knows that this series of questions comprised the major portion of Comrade Mao Tze-tung's long struggle against opportunism (sometimes in the form of adventurism and sometimes in the form of escapism). All who opposed Comrade Mao Tze-tung were opposing Stalin.

In 1927, after Chiang Kai-shek committed his act of betrayal in Shanghai, the strategic problems of revolutionary warfare came to the forefront. The Trotskyites at that time advocated an offensive against Shanghai. Stalin opposed such adventurism. Stalin said at that time, "Shanghai is the world center of the interlocking of important interests of imperialist groups." Stalin advocated "the building up of sufficient military strength, full development of the agrarian revolution, intensification of the work of undermining Chiang Kai-shek's rear and front and then after that to raise the entire problem of Shanghai." (Stalin: Talk with the students of Sun Yat-sen University). Because, "not to avoid decisive battle under unfavorable conditions (when it can be avoided) means facilitating the cause of the enemies of the revolution." (Stalin: Questions of the Chinese Revolution). But during the 10-year Civil War period, our "left" opportunists advocated launching just such an elemental, blind, adventurous offensive against the big cities under great odds. They advocated waging a decisive battle with the enemy under unfavorable conditions.

Stalin said, "Some comrades think that an offensive on all fronts now is the basic sign of being revolutionary. No, comrades, this is not true. An offensive on all fronts at the present moment (after the betrayal of the revolution by Chiang Kai-shek: Chen Po-ta's note) is stupidity, it is not being revolutionary. Never mix up stupidity with being revolutionary." (Stalin: Talks with the students of Sun Yat-sen University). But during the 10-year Civil War period our "left" opportunists advocated just such on offensive on all fronts without regard for any conditions whatsoever, mixing up stupidity with being revolutionary.

Stalin said: "The revolutionary movement must not be considered as proceeding in a continuously rising line. This is a bookish, not a realistic conception of revolution. Revolution always develops in a zigzag line, attacking and destroying the old order in certain places and suffering partial defeats and retreating in other places." (Stalin: Talk with the students of Sun Yat-sen University). But during the 10-year Civil War period, our "left" opportunists thought just that very thing—that the revolution can only be a movement proceeding in a continuously rising line and that the advance of a revolution cannot have any curve. Therefore they believed that if there was to be an offensive at all then it must be an all-out offensive or, what they called, "attacking on all fronts." If someone advocated an offensive in a certain area but wanted to retreat and take the defensive in another area, then they would "judge" this to be "opportunism."

Stalin said, "It is impossible to take upon oneself all tasks at once at the risk of overstraining oneself." (Stalin: Talk with the students of Sun Yat-sen University). But during the 10-year Civil War period, at a time when our revolutionary strength was still very inadequate, the "left" opportunists advocated just that very thing—that we take upon ourselves all tasks of "overthrowing all" and "attacking on all fronts" and all the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution and the Socialist revolution at once. If someone criticized such action saying it would "risk overstraining oneself," well then, they were sure to label such a person an "opportunist."

It is clear that ever since 1927, the comrades in our Party who at one time or another, committed all kinds of opportunist mistakes and opposed Comrade Mao Tze-tung's correct line, did so because all of them had forgotten every lesson contained in Stalin's refutation of the Trotskyites in 1927. This was the case regardless of whether the issue involved the nature or the tactics of the revolution, whether it was political or military. All this caused our revolution to suffer quite a lot of bitter hardships in the course of its advance.

IV

COMRADE Mao Tze-tung is correct. Under his leadership, our Party, travelling devious paths, finally overcame both the objective difficulties and the subjective errors and carried the revolution to victory. This was because Comrade Mao Tze-tung's views on the nature and tactics

of the Chinese revolution were identical with those of Stalin. Furthermore, he developed Stalin's theory regarding the Chinese revolution in the course of the concrete practice of this revolution.

During the First Great Revolution (editor's note: the revolution of 1925-27) he strongly maintained that the proletariat must lead the peasants' revolutionary movement against feudalism in order to support the struggle against imperialism, opposing the right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu.

During the 10-year Civil War period, although in the midst of the agrarian revolutionary movement of that time, Comrade Mao Tze-tung did not for an instant forget this extremely important political factor, anti-imperialism, and opposed "left" opportunism.

In formulating strategic plans for establishing revolutionary bases as well as in determining the policies toward every class, such as the winning over of the middle classes etc., Comrade Mao Tze-tung always took into account this factor of opposing imperialism.

During the war of resistance against Japan, Comrade Mao Tze-tung believed that the proletariat and its vanguard must set the peasant masses in motion so that the anti-Japanese war could have a broad mass foundation and thus have the possibility of ending in a people's victory. Therefore he conducted an extremely stubborn struggle against right opportunism.

History has proved: these struggles conducted in every revolutionary period by Comrade Mao Tze-tung, whose views accorded with Stalin's, were correct. Particularly those struggles regarding party line which took place at the beginning and middle of the anti-Japanese war had a decisive effect on the overall situation of the present victory of the Chinese revolution.

One fact must be made clear, however: for a very long period, both before 1927 when Chen Tu-hsiu was in power and afterwards, the opportunists either intentionally or unintentionally obstructed the dissemination inside the Chinese Party of Stalin's many works on the Chinese question. There were also the language difficulties and the counter-revolutionary blockade. For these reasons, there were many comrades in our Party who were actually leading the Chinese revolution but who did not have an opportunity to make a systematic study of Stalin's many works about China. Comrade Mao Tze-tung was also one of them.

It was only after the ideological remolding movement in 1942 that Stalin's numerous works on China were systematically edited by our Party. Not long ago, following a decision by Comrade Mao Tze-tung, the book "Lenin and Stalin on China" was edited and became one of the 12 books which cadres must study.

It was a great misfortune for our Party that the opportunists, in the interests of disseminating their own erroneous concepts and proposals, either intentionally or unintentionally kept back Stalin's works on China.

But, despite this situation, Comrade Mao Tze-tung had been able to reach the same conclusions as Stalin on many fundamental problems through his independent thinking based on the fundamental revolutionary science of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Thus his correctness and that of his comrades-in-arms was maintained.

It was during the anti-Japanese war that Comrade Mao Tze-tung had an opportunity to read Stalin's works extensively. He read and pondered over with the greatest enthusiasm all the available works of Stalin. As everyone knows, Comrade Mao Tze-tung, writing in "New Democracy," made clear what an important source of enlightenment Stalin's works had been to him. Comrade Mao Tze-tung explained that the correct thesis put forth by the Chinese Communists in stating that the Chinese revolution is a part of the world Socialist revolution had been based upon Stalin's theory. It was on the basis of this theory of Stalin's that Comrade Mao Tze-tung enlarged upon the idea of the leadership of the proletariat. In this well-known militant work of his, he delivered powerful blows to the reactionary dream of establishing a bourgeois dictatorship in China, while at the same time delivering fatal blows to the opportunists within the Party who were trying to make the proletariat follow the tail of the bourgeoisie.

In his many writings since the anti-Japanese war, Comrade Mao Tze-tung particularly liked to ponder upon Stalin's famous sayings that "The characteristic of the Chinese revolution lies in the fact that it is an armed people opposing an armed counter-revolution," and that "The colonial and semi-colonial question is in essence the peasant question." On the basis of Chinese conditions, Comrade Mao Tze-tung correlated these two famous sayings of Stalin's and enlarged upon them. He severely condemned the opportunists in our Party during the anti-Japanese war who had ignored this most fundamental concept and policy that the proletariat must lead the peasant war.

In order to prepare for our revolutionary victory, Comrade Mao Tze-tung launched an ideological remolding movement within our Party in 1941-42. At that time he particularly liked to cite again and again Stalin's saying on the interrelation between theory and practice which appeared in "The Foundations of Leninism"—the masterpiece that ideologically armed the Bolsheviks throughout the world.

Comrade Mao Tze-tung said: "Again it was Stalin who was right in saying: 'Theory becomes aimless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice.' Of course he was also right in saying: 'practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illuminated by revolutionary theory.'" Comrade Mao Tze-tung used Stalin's former saying to oppose the dogmatists in our Party and he used Stalin's latter saying to oppose the empiricists in our party.

Comrade Mao Tze-tung selected Stalin's writing on the 12 prerequisites of Bolshevization and the six points in the conclusion of the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)" as the most basic documents for our Party's ideological remolding movement. In order that our comrades would deeply reflect on these two documents by Stalin, Comrade Mao Tze-tung specially made a long address, in which he held that these two documents were identical: They were both the summation of Marxist-Leninist experience in revolutionary leadership over a period of 100 years. He gave point by point explanation of these two documents based on our Party's 20 odd years of experience, differentiating between true Marxism-Leninism and false Marxism-Leninism. These two documents dealt severe blows to dogmatism and empiricism during the ideological remolding movement.

In his article on "Reform our Study," Comrade Mao Tze-tung urged that Stalin's great work, the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)" be used as the main text for studying Marxism-Leninism in our Party. Comrade Mao Tze-tung wrote:

"'The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)' constitutes the highest synthesis and summation of the world Communist movement during the last 100 years. It is the model of the union of theory and practice, and it is the only perfect model in the entire world. By seeing how Lenin and Stalin interlinked the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Soviet revolution and in this way developed Marxism, we can know how work should be done in China."

Comrade Mao Tze-tung is Stalin's student and comrade-in-arms. He was able to become Stalin's outstanding student and to become the leader of China's victorious revolution because his methods of work and his methodology are those of Stalin's. He applied Stalin's methods to the study of Stalin. These were the methods of creative Marxists which Stalin referred to in his famous article written to commemorate Lenin's 50th birthday:

"This group does not derive its directions and instructions from historical analogies and parallels, but from a study of surrounding conditions. It does not base its activities on quotations and maxims, but on practical experiences, testing every step by experience, learning from its mistakes and teaching others how to build a new life. This, in fact, explains why where is no discrepancy between word and deed in the activities of this group, and why the teachings of Marx completely retain their living, revolutionary force." This is precisely why Stalin's thoughts and teachings "completely retain their living, revolutionary force" when they come into Comrade Mao Tze-tung's hands.

There are some people in our Party who, like the dogmatists we have mentioned previously, may perhaps subjectively wish to study Stalin but who use anti-Stalinist methods in doing so. Just as Comrade Mao Tze-tung has said: "Their method for studying Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin runs directly counter to Mark, Engels, Lenin and Stalin." Their method is like that of the dogmatists mentioned in Stalin's article on Lenin's 50th birthday:

"It does not base its activities on experience, on what practical work teaches, but on quotations from Marx. It does not derive its instructions and directions from an analysis of actual realities, but from analogies and historical parallels. Discrepancy between word and deed is the chief malady of this group. Hence that disillusionment and perpetual grudge against the fate which time and again betrays it."

Stalin's teachings, methods and theories, after they had been introduced and applied by Comrade Mao Tze-tung, greatly broadened the political and ideological vision of Chinese Communists. They elevated the Marxist-Leninist consciousness of Chinese Communists and helped our Party acquire sufficient ideological strength to defeat all counter-revolutionary enemies and other enemies impeding the revolutionary advance.

We have already obtained a revolutionary victory. We must continue to be victorious. But how can we ensure our continued victories? As Comrade Mao Tze-tung has frequently told us: We must be adept at learning.

We must be adept at learning from Stalin—the banner of mankind's great victory, our teacher. We must be adept at learning from the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moreover, like Comrade Mao Tze-tung, we must in our studies apply the method of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. In short, we must apply the method of combining theory and practice.

Let us repeat once more what Comrade Mao Tze-tung said 10 years ago in celebrating Stalin's 60th birthday: "We must hail him, support him and learn from him."

Learn from Stalin—this is still our main conclusion in celebrating Stalin's 70th birthday.

For the happiness and future of mankind, long live the supreme, the glorious, the great Stalin!

(Translated by the New China News Agency)

NEWS OF THE WEEK

Colombo Conference Conclusions; US Consular Officials Recalled

THE six-day secret meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Commonwealth countries ended in Ceylon on January 14 in what was described as "a blaze of eloquent speeches by the eight Commonwealth delegations." The eight delegations were Great Britain, Canada, India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ceylon. In addition, Southern Rhodesia took part in the discussions.

At a short secret session on January 14 the Ministers finally approved the communique issued at the end of the meeting.

Of this communique, British Foreign Minister Bevin said, according to reports from Colombo: "The communique is a good communique. It must be good. I helped to prepare it, and I draw special attention of correspondents to the fact."

Mr. Percy Spender, Australian External Affairs Minister said: "We are living today under the shadow of an approaching storm. Whether the storm will break or whether it will pass by leaving clear skies is yet to be seen."

India's Pandit Nehru said: "To say this conference was going to solve world problems is just not to understand either world problems or this conference. If world problems could be solved that way, they should have been solved. We may not solve world problems, but such a conference helps us to prevent things from going completely astray."

Some of the problems which the conference sought to keep from going "completely astray" are as follows:

China. Discussion on China is said to have resolved itself into a general admission of the inevitability of eventual recognition of the Central People's Government. But there was varying emphasis on timing—already reflected in recognition before the conference by Britain and three Asian members, and non-recognition by the four other conference members, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Pandit Nehru was the chief spokesman for the speedy establishment of diplomatic relations with the Central People's Government as a means of giving "maximum encouragement to the People's Government of China to evolve an independent policy." Canada's attitude reflected a desire to "move in harmony with her powerful neighbor, the United States." In discussing America's attitude to recognition it was felt that when Ambassador Jessup, at present at large on a tour of the Far East, returns to the United States he will be "better able to judge the factors which have led Commonwealth countries towards recognition."

Burma. The problem was said to be mainly an economic one dependent on a domestic political solution. The decision in principle to make a £7,500,000 loan to Burma suggests that the scale of direct aid to Southeast Asia will necessarily be limited.

Malaya. The conference agreed that "elimination of insurgents" is needed before there can be "consolidation" in the political and economic fields.

Indonesia. The conference members look with favor on the new United States of Indonesia as a "stable political and economic unit in the eventual non-Communist pattern of Southeast Asia."

Thailand. Observers believe that outside aid is more likely to come from America than from the Commonwealth.

Ceylon. During the conference the Ceylon and Australia delegations presented a scheme for economic cooperation between those countries. If this scheme is approved by Commonwealth governments, an experts conference might be called in Canberra, Australia's capital, next March to draw up detailed plans for implementing the scheme.

The scheme, which seeks to integrate the economy of participating nations, will, in the first instance, be limited to Commonwealth countries only, but, at a later stage, non-Commonwealth nations might be invited to participate.

South Africa. Mr. Paul Sauer, South African Minister of Transport and South Africa's delegate made a contribution to the discussions which was "distinguished by impassive realism."

Colombo reports said: "Though Communism in South Africa is weak, it has at the same time made some headway among urbanized African populations, and for this reason, particularly, information on the methods adopted by Asian countries to check the spread of Communism would be of considerable interest to South Africa."

Anti-Communism. India's Nehru has said that while Southeast Asian problems loomed large at the Colombo conference, there was no question of any joint defense plans against Communism being visualized by it. Making the first ministerial comment since the conference disbanded, Nehru told reporters at Nagpur Airport on January 15: "We did not even discuss it."

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COMMENTING on the conference, the *New York Times* on January 15 urged the United States to cooperate whole-heartedly in the British Commonwealth mutual aid program. It said that "we must combat, by every spiritual as well as physical means, the impression that we have withdrawn our major interest from the Asiatic sphere." As measures which the United States could adopt it suggested: 1) Aid to the United States of Indonesia; 2) Prompt recognition of Bao Dai; 3) Immediate talks with the Commonwealth on aid to Burma; 4) An early assurance that the Colombo decisions on mutual aid would have American support with money and "ideas and attitudes;" 5) "Pushing" the strengthening of South Korea and the Phillipines.

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IN Colombo, as the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers were concluding their meetings on January 14, Colombo's newly-elected mayor, Dr. Kuraran Rutham, was opening the all-Ceylon Peace Conference organized by the Communist Party.

About 2,000 delegates, including Buddhist priests, were attending the meetings, expected to follow the lines of previous peace conferences in Europe and the United States.

The picture of Chairman Mao Tze-tung, of the Chinese Central People's Government, hangs in the conference room alongside the portraits of Lenin and Stalin.

The delegates attending the peace conference issued a pamphlet attacking the Commonwealth "war-mongers' conference" and calling for "mobilization against the war plans of the imperialists."

The police confiscated the pamphlets issued by the peace conference.

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Consular Officials Recalled

THE State Department has announced that it is recalling all American consular officials in the Chinese People's Republic.

There are 135 American officials and dependents throughout the Chinese People's Republic—at Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Tsingtao and Nanking.

The full reasons that underlie this action are not yet known, but it is assumed to have arisen out of the taking over of property held by the American consulate in Peking since the time of the Boxer Rebellion in 1901. This property was originally a barracks for American troops. Chinese government authorities took over this property officially as from January 14.

It is understood that Britain has officially agreed to look after American interests in China while Washington is not itself in diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government.

Property held by the Dutch and French governments in Peking has also been taken over by the Chinese authorities in Peking.

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Demand For Resignation

REPUBLICAN Senator Knowland of California demanded in Washington on January 14 the resignation of United States administration officials "responsible for American policy towards China."

He told reporters that his demand for resignations was aimed chiefly at Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who announced the Peking developments.

"If the policies of the Far Eastern Division are approved by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the shoe fits him too," Senator Knowland said.

The State Department's announcement that it was withdrawing official United States staffs from liberated China, he continued, "underscores the result of our bankrupt China policy."

Angry "lawmakers" proposed that the United States classify Communists in China as "outlaws" and shun any diplomatic dealings with them as a result of the taking-over of property in Peking, Washington reports say.

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The US Supply Line

PRESS reports from Lima (Ohio) and Philadelphia said that tanks and armored cars, consigned to Taiwan, were loaded aboard a Turkish freighter at a Philadelphia dock on January 10.

The ship is due to leave port this week and, according to its agents, it is carrying sulphite also for Taiwan.

In answer to inquiries regarding the shipment of these arms, the Department of State in Washington revealed the following facts: "The shipment in question consisted of approximately 100 each armored cars and scout cars and 70 light tanks and constitutes the major shipment of residual equipment yet unshipped under the $125,000,000 grants provided for by the China Aid Act of 1948. All funds available under this authorization were obligated prior to expiration of the Act on April 3, 1949. As President Truman said on January 5, no further military aid will be provided to the Chinese Government, but it should be remembered that the Chinese Nationalists have access to normal commercial areas and markets here and elsewhere in the world if they choose to spend foreign exchange reserves still under their control. A small amount of residual material purchased under the grants remains to be shipped. No further shipment comparable in amount or value to the current shipment are in prospect."

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Repudiation of Tsiang

THE Soviet delegate, M. Jacob Malik, walked out of the Security Council on January 13 after his resolution urging the expulsion of Dr. T. F. Tsiang had been rejected.

By a vote of six for rejecting the resolution, three against and two abstentions, the Council refused the Soviet Union's resolution. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and India voted for the resolution; the United States, Cuba, T. F. Tsiang, Egypt, Ecuador and France against; Britain and Norway abstained.

M. Malik, reading a prepared statement, said: "The non-adoption of the proposal submitted by the Soviet delegation shows that the United States, and those who follow the United States, have overtly taken the path of fostering lawlessness in the Security Council and in the United Nations in general.

"In extending their support to the illegal maintenance in the Security Council of the representative of the Kuomintang clique, the delegation of the United States has helped undermine the authority and the prestige, not only of the Security Council itself, but of the United Nations Organization as such.

"This shows that narrow, egotistical, political and military interests are placed by the United States above the interests of the United Nations, above the interests of peace and international cooperation.

"History teaches that backward reactionary policies that cling to things obsolete are doomed to perdition, are bound to fail.

"There is no doubt," he continued, "that even the most sworn reactionaries will have to bow to the significance of events.

"On the other hand, the position of the Soviet Union is a just position, a position of principle.

"The Soviet Union will not participate in the Security Council until the representative of the Kuomintang group, who illegally occupies a seat in

Chinese Press Opinion:

Discussion Of British Recognition

COMMENTING on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and England, the *Ta Kung Pao* of January 11, 1950 stated: "As a typical capitalist country, Great Britain has invested huge sums in China and her commercial interests are extensive. It is thus altogether frank for British public opinion to declare that the establishment of diplomatic relations with China is entirely due to commercial considerations . . . there is no denying the fact that the British decision is entirely based on their own actual needs and interests. In this respect, the British are quite honest about the whole matter by declaring that the establishment of diplomatic relations does not mean approval of New China's political policy but rather acceptance of a fait accompli. . .

"For the moment Great Britain is being beset by economic troubles. As she has to export and stands badly in need of markets, it is imperative for her to develop her trade relations with China.

"Under such circumstances, it is completely agreeable with us that England is in favor of trade with China. Since, in turning to a program of peaceful reconstruction, China will be needing large quantities of machinery, and, in the implementation of agrarian reforms, the broad agrarian markets will be fully developed, the future of Sino-British trade will be bright."

The editorial pointed out that the establishment of relations between the two countries marks an important development in international relations and shows up the present economic contradictions between England and the US. The editorial stated that the present diplomatic victory has been the result of the implementation of the 'lean-to-one-side' policy of Chairman Mao Tze-tung.

"The Chinese people put their faith in the true friendship of the British people, but there is a distinction between the true friendship of the people and the diplomacy of a capitalist nation."

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The *Sin Wen Jih Pao* of January 11, 1950 welcomed the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and England and stated: "The fact that, among the capitalist nations, Britain is willing to establish diplomatic relations with us is irrefutable proof that the Chinese people's revolutionary victory is accepted as an established event in the world." Warning that in all relations with capitalist countries China must adopt a solemn attitude and abide steadfastly by her principles, the editorial explains its attitude thus: "That is to say, we have to consider all facts, whether these nations have severed their relations with the KMT bandits, whether they are friendly towards China, and the attitude they are adopting towards our nationals residing in their countries.

"In the case of Britain, the rude distorted views on this question given out by the British Information Service naturally put us on our guard. It is our hope that the British government is going to practice what it preaches and in all respects be more circumspect."

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The *Wen Hui Pao* on January 11, 1950 criticized a news report issued by the British Information Service explaining British recognition of the Central People's Government and stated:

"In the first place, the British explain that the recognition of a government does not imply approval of the policy of that government.

"In the second place, the United States is still not desirous of recognizing China, and though there are certain dissenting points over short term strategical problems, the two nations are unanimous in their long-term objective of checking the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.

"In the third place, though Britain is establishing relations with China, the British do not relax for a bit their continuous war on the Malayan Communists, and their determination to devote general efforts to prevent the overflow of communist influence out of China.

"This truthful revelation is of the greatest educational significance to the Chinese people."

Pointing out that the diplomatic policy which the Central People's Government has been pursuing has been a correct one, and that on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect of territory and sovereignty, China is prepared to enter into relations with any country, the article concludes by saying that China has learned a valuable lesson in diplomacy from the British. "But if we are to consolidate the victory which we have already won and move speedily on the road to reconstruction, we must be determined to 'lean to one side.'"

The Observer Magazine:

National Conferences in China

ON November 1, one month after the founding of the new People's Republic of China, the various ministries and departments under the State Administration Council began to function officially. With the liberation of the whole of China in sight, it was decided unanimously that the major task in 1950 would be concerned with production and reconstruction. To prepare for the launching of a nation-wide drive, no less than 23 conferences on specialized issues were scheduled. They were to be convened by the Ministries of Conservancy, Agriculture, Trade, Communications (Shipping and Highways), Posts and Tele-Communications, Heavy Industries, Light Industries, Fuel, Finance, Railways, and by the Import Planning Board.

These national conferences, writes *Kwan Cha's* (Observer) special correspondent in the New Year's Day issue, "make up the overture to the march of national reconstruction of the People's Republic of China." He says: "The gigantic central machine has started to move, and the blueprints of economic reconstruction of New China are being slowly prepared."

Between November 1 and the end of 1949, some 14 of these national conferences were held in Peking. Some of the main decisions resulting from only a few of these important meetings are summarized here from *Kwan Cha's* fuller report:—

Conservancy: 10-day Preparatory Meeting, all liberated areas represented. Major tasks outlined for 1950: flood prevention, development of irrigation facilities in dry areas, study and research in conservancy, development of hydro-electric power, re-planning of shipping routes, building of canals.

Agriculture: First assembly of agricultural technicians from all liberated areas. Emphasis on production of food and increase of cotton. Preliminary goals, raising of food production 25% and cotton 42% to reach pre-Japanese war levels. Emphases a) Conservancy projects b) Live-stock breeding c) Fertilizers d) Insect-control e) Agricultural equipment f) Development of uncultivated land g) Use of new scientific techniques. The role of agricultural cooperatives was discussed with the Central Cooperatives Control Bureau and of afforestation with the Ministry of Forestry. The Finance-Economic Committee has since ratified the agricultural production plan submitted by this conference.

"This," comments the writer, "is the first instance of planned production in China. The plan is realistic, and not high-sounding. To achieve the goals set, it has been stressed that the huge labor force in the country must be mobilized and organized."

Trade: Tea Conference completed. Others (Silk, Bristles, Hides, Feathers, Oils, Fats) still in progress or to be opened early in the New Year. The China Tea Company was set up as the central organization operated by the State for purchase, processing, improvement of tea produced. Head Office established in Peking and branches to be set up in principal tea distributing centers throughout the country. Goal for 1950: To establish 20 modern factories each capable of processing 10,000 piculs of tea. The State will undertake expansion of export trade, while domestic sales will be mainly in the hands of private enterprises.

Fuel: The 14 day national Coal Conference followed the North China Coal Conference, and decided upon production policy for 1950. Minimum requirements were estimated at 23,540,000 tons, and it was planned to produce 36,660,000 tons. Stress to be laid on development in the Northeast, where 29 old pits are to be restored and 11 modern new ones built, with object of reaching pre-war production level of 24,000,000 tons annually within three years. In North China and East China the drive will be towards former peak production goals. The national production goal is set at 51,000,000 tons by 1952.

Iron & Steel: Much preparatory work preceded the Iron and Steel Conference. The iron and steel industry is the backbone of all heavy industries and a prerequisite for the modernization of industry, communications and agriculture. In the past China's raw iron has been annexed by Japan, and steel treatment capacity is therefore undeveloped in China, together with steel rolling capacity. During 1950, the authorities plan to invest considerably in development of iron and steel. The industry will be centered in the Northeast, and a call has been issued to technicians to take up their posts there.

Light Industries: The first Paper Conference, a high priority, "to meet the rising tide of cultural development," is still in progress and the decisions are not yet made known.

Railways: The speed and efficiency with which rail communications have already been restored and developed augurs well for the future. The first National Conference met at Peking in December 1949, and decisions are not yet fully available. Orders have already been issued by the Ministry, however, to railway administrations throughout the country to carry out new measures for maintenance of the lines. Other measures will be patterned on the technical experience of the Soviet Union in this field.

this organ of the United Nations, has been removed."

"At the same time, the delegation of the Soviet Union wishes to declare that the Union of Soviet Republics will not recognize as legal any decisions of the Security Council adopted with the participation of the representative of the Kuomintang group, and will not feel itself bound by such decisions."

* * *

Italian Workers Killed

The Italian Labor Confederation, at an emergency session in Rome on January 9, called a 24-hour general strike of metal workers throughout Italy in protest against the death of six workers who were shot down by police at Modena, northern Italy, on that day.

The six men were killed when police opened fire on workers who were attempting to enter four steel mills where a lockout had been declared by the owners. Earlier the metal workers in Modena had called an eight-hour strike.

Press reports said that in addition to six dead, one other was mortally injured, 30 badly hurt and 60 slightly hurt.

Signor Giuseppe di Vittorio, General Secretary of the Labor Confederation declared: "This cannot go on."

During the week, meetings and demonstrations have been called throughout Italy to commemorate the death of the six workers.

Two hundred thousand workers poured into the center of Modena on January 11 to hear the funeral oration delivered by Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti. Nearly 100 Communist and Socialist members of parliament assembled in Modena to follow the funeral procession.

Left-wing Deputies and Senators later held a meeting to condemn the action of the police. The Executive Council of the General Labor Confederation and the Communist Youth movement also held a meeting.

In Rome, workers downed tools for four hours and gathered in the Piazza del Popolo (the People's Square) for a mass demonstration.

Signor Togliatti in his oration charged Christian Democrat Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi with "direct responsibility" for the "murder" by the police.

He said that the deaths of the six workers were the result of "the government's policy of oppression of the workers and protection of the privileged classes."

* * *

Military Aid to Tito

THE State Department was reported, in Washington January 11, to have decided on measures of limited military aid for Marshall Tito which it would recommend to the President in an "emergency."

The National Security Council, the nation's top policy-making body on foreign affairs, was reported to have approved a stand-by program of possible measures by the United States to supplement the aid already given to Tito "in the economic and political phases of his struggle."

In the light of this action, the State Department has determined what

specific steps it would recommend to President Truman.

* * *

Union in Indonesia?

WORKERS at the American-owned Standard Vacuum Oil refinery at Sungei Gerong, near Palembang in Sumatra, have demanded a 200 percent increase in pay and a month's paid holiday yearly as terms for calling off the strike which they began on January 8.

Some workers said that they had been assured by their leaders that they would receive a small bag of gold and double pay when Indonesian "sovereignty" was proclaimed on December 27.

When this did not materialize, their strike leaders ordered them to down tools.

No settlement of the dispute is yet in sight, and all petrol shipments are held up.

At Belawan, in East Sumatra, non-unionist workers unloaded rice on January 9, under the protection of troops as the Belawan dock workers strike entered its second week, with the East Sumatra food situation threatened.

No incidents have been reported, says *Aneta*, the Dutch news agency.

Meanwhile, the strikers have formed a delegation to take part in negotiations for a settlement.

Two Indonesian newspapers suggested editorially that the United States of Indonesia, as a central authority, should intervene if the East Sumatra government does not prove "strong enough" to effect a settlement.

* * *

On British Recognition

NEW China's reply to the British Government on the question of recognition reached London on January 10, the British Foreign Office announced. The Foreign Office is now seeking clarification on a point where there appears to be some confusion, according to "diplomatic quarters" in London.

In his note, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai said that the Central People's Government was willing to "accept Mr. J. Hutchison, whom you have appointed as Charge d'Affaires *ad interim* as the representative of the Government of the United Kingdom sent to Peking to carry on negotiations on the question of establishing diplomatic relations between our two countries."

According to a usually reliable source, Mr. W. G. Graham, British Counsellor in Peking, may be instructed to ask the purpose of the negotiations proposed by the Chinese Government.

In diplomatic quarters in London, it was believed that Chou En-lai's note was under study for the purpose of deciding whether immediately to send Mr. Hutchison from Nanking to Peking to negotiate, as proposed by the Chinese Government, or whether to ask for a clarification about the purpose of the proposed negotiations.

* * *

IN London, the *Daily Worker* carried an editorial on December 13 pointing out that recognition of the new China by India or subsequent recognition by Britain and the Dominions would not mean that a period of good relations, including extended trade, is opening up.

"On the contrary," the editorial said, "the Colombo Conference is going to discuss the development of an imperialist counter-offensive against the people's liberation struggle in Asia.

"A further powerful struggle on the part of the peace forces in Britain is necessary before really peaceful relations can be established."

* * *

ON January 10, the *New China News Agency* issued an editorial concerning British recognition, criticizing the official British Information Service for

The Week's Business

Revised business tax regulations and measures governing income tax on interest issued; bullish trend persists in local market.

SHANGHAI'S market was still pervaded with idle capital, and the bullish trend in local commodity markets continued, largely due to revived speculative activities.

The rate for the parity deposit unit during the week under review from January 12 to 18 went up by 6.5 percent, reaching a figure of above JMP4,000 per unit on Wednesday. Rice prices in general led the upward climb, mainly forced up by speculative merchants. Three local rice shops were discovered engaged in curb dealings, and were duly penalized.

The money situation remained easy, since despite the floating of Victory Bonds and the collection of the third period business tax, a considerable amount of idle funds still exists in the market. According to a compilation made by the Shanghai Branch of the People's Bank on January 10, only some 1,000,000 units of Victory Bonds were issued by that date, recalling around JMP15,000,000,000. This amount is less than one-fifteenth of the total capital of local private banking institutions.

This figure, of course, does not include those bonds already subscribed to but not yet paid. The Shanghai cotton textile industry is reported to have already subscribed to more than 740,000 units alone. Chinese residents in Hongkong have also sent money to Shanghai to buy bonds. The subscription to 20,000 Victory Bond units by the China Mutual Trading Company in Hongkong was recently reported in the local press.

On January 16, the local authorities announced revised business tax regulations and measures governing the collection of income tax on interest.

The revised taxation scales were from 80 to 100 percent higher than those announced in August, 1949, while the scope of taxable business was widened. The hike in the taxation rates was made necessary, the People's Government explained, to meet the exigencies of the national budget estimate of 1950 and because of the low rates in Shanghai in comparison with other localities. Under the revised regulations, all businesses are subject to taxation.

Interest derived from deposits in financial enterprises and from government bonds or corporation bonds is subject to the collection of income tax beginning from January 15, 1950. This income tax, at a rate of five percent, will be levied through the banks where the deposits are kept, according to the newly announced measures.

Meanwhile, the interflow of supplies between Shanghai and other parts of the country has been boosted by the resumption of through traffic service between Shanghai and Canton. According to recent compilations, the supplies imported through Shanghai during the month of December, 1949 aggregated a little more than 201,773 tons, including upwards of 12,063 tons of export goods and 189,709, tons of import goods.

The goods brought to Shanghai include 140,149 tons of coal, 10,937 tons of rice, 7,416 tons of cotton, 2,814 tons of soyabeans, 1,145 tons of wheat, and 884 tons of tea. The supplies that Shanghai sent to other cities consisted of mainly cotton textile goods, cotton yarn, cigarette paper and wheat flour.

Considerable quantities of Shanghai goods have also been re-exported via Tientsin and Tsingtao lately. According to a report in the *Wen Hui Pao*, around 2,000 tons of tung oil and 2,000 tons of tea are expected to be exported from this port shortly. Since the beginning of the current month, more than 1,000 tons of tung oil have been brought to Shanghai from Szechuen.

The local state trading corporations and both state and private mills are reported to have ordered some 100,000 piculs of foreign cotton from abroad, which are slated to be imported in the immediate future.

Quotations

Following is a listing of representative commodity prices for the past week:

	Jan. 11 JMP	Jan. 18 JMP
Parity Unit	3,851	4,057
US dollar (note)	18,500	20,700
20's yarn	3,500,000	3,800,000
12-lb. cloth	153,500	164,000
Rice, 1st grade	185,000	202,000
Peanut oil	365,000	360,000
Coal briquette	26,000	26,000

the continuing hostility of its attitude to the Central People's Government and its "rude misrepresentation" of the People's Republic of China as a "Chinese Communist Government" in its dispatch of January 6. This dispatch came from the London Press Service, the news service of the British Information Service, a government organization.

The *New China News Agency* criticized the British government for its continuing relations with the Nationalists on Taiwan, its support of Franco and its terrorist campaign against the liberation forces in Burma.

It said that the Chinese people can draw "useful lessons" from the aforementioned dispatch, namely that "people oppressed by imperialism should in no way entertain any illusions about imperialism. The oppressed nations can only win freedom by forcing the imperialists 'to recognize' this freedom through their own struggle, like that put up by the Chinese people. . ."

* * *

Nobody Loves Them

MR. E. T. Briggs, British consul in Tamsui, Taiwan, reported on January 10 that eight armed men had broken into the British compound, held up two of his staff and forced them to surrender the consul flag.

Announcing this, the British Foreign Office said that Mr. Briggs also reported that six soldiers entered the house of a junior member of his staff and assaulted one of his servants.

A Hongkong report said that Kuomintang soldiers also prevented Chinese workers from entering or leaving the British consulate on January 9, and removed the consulate's sign.

Governor K. C. Wu, having received a protest from the Foreign Office, is reported to be trying to prevent any further "military mob violence."

* * *

After the Last Ditch

IN Manila, a number of legislators are reported planning to make speeches when the Philippine Congress meets towards the end of this month on whether Chiang Kai-shek should be allowed to establish himself in the Philippines after he has made his "last ditch stand" on Taiwan.

Several new congressmen, the reports add, favor a strict hands-off policy in Asian affairs so as to avoid international complications.

President Quirino had previously stated that the Philippine Republic could not very well refuse Chiang if he and his remnant government should seek refuge in that country.

Meanwhile, the proposal advocated by Representative Emmanuel Pelaez to send a congressional committee to Taiwan to "make a first-hand study of the situation there" was assailed by other lower house members who described the plan as irresponsible interference in the affairs of a sovereign state.

Further news from Manila states that the airlifting of silver dollars from the Philippines to Taiwan has been stopped. Madame Chiang Kai-shek called at Manila this week in the course of her trip to Taiwan.

NEW BOOKS OF INTEREST

THE SITUATION IN ASIA *by Owen Lattimore, Little, Brown and Company, 1949, 244 pages. $2.75. Reviewed by Julian Schuman.*

SINCE VJ Day American policy in Asia, with China as the most glaring example, has suffered reverses of no small significance. Owen Lattimore's "The Situation In Asia" states that this policy has been based on illusions. Long before the White Paper was published this book named one of the American illusions in Asia —"dependable" Chinese, another way of describing the State Department's quest for "democratic individualists." Some of the other illusions, according to Lattimore, are Japan as a bulwark and the belief that nationalism in India and other "safe" Asian nations can be made subservient to foreign capital and aid.

"The Situation In Asia" was written at the end of 1948 and published early in 1949. Even before the PLA crossed the Yangtze, while Washington was listening to people like Chennault, Judd, Knowland and others braying about holding a line in south and southwest China, Lattimore stated, "Until we get some of the illusions shaken out of us, we are certain to go on stumbling into the same kind of mess that we stumbled into in China. . ." Despite his being recognized as one of America's leading and most informed students on the Far East, Lattimore's book, if it has been read, apparently was placed in the file-and-forget department by American policy makers.

Reduced to a few words, "The Situation In Asia" says that America and the Western European colonial powers no longer can control events in Asia. Even in those areas which still nominally remain under their wing the spirit of nationalism is too strong to be subjugated for long. Basically, the West is unable to bring back the old order no matter what the subterfuge and, as Lattimore clearly points out, America is dealing herself and the very democracy she claims to stand for a body blow in backing British, Dutch or French attempts to climb back into the saddle in southeast Asia.

Lattimore's chief, and basically incorrect, point is that in the long run Asia is dependent in a great measure on the development of what he calls Asia's "third countries"—China, the Union of India, Pakistan and later Japan and Indonesia. In arriving at this he claims that the area in Asia which America will be able to control will shrink while the area out of America's control will continue to expand. He believes it realistic to forecast that Russia's power to control Asia will not expand nearly as rapidly as the power of America and Europe to control Asia decreases. Based on this assumption, Lattimore's thesis is that in the gap which will arise will come the "third countries," which America could be able to get along with if an intelligent policy greatly different from its present one is pursued. These countries, he claims, also will be able to deal with Russia and get along with her without becoming puppets.

While Lattimore is quite correct in seeing that Asia will not fall into the puppet category he falls down in his "third country" theory. In line with this, "third countries" will be stoppers against both American and Russian expansion. However, this overlooks the simple fact that, as in China, there are no third groups of any consequence and the only recourse to stopping the advancing revolution all over Asia, which is national in SCOPE, is trying to build up a third force on the foundations of what are fast crumbling to dust. For Asia, the die has already been cast and to think in terms of third forces is simply scrounging around for stopgaps to the inevitable and following a course of setting up temporary obstacles to popular movements. What Lattimore apparently forgets is that all of America's attempts to find this third force, as in much of Asia and Europe, has led to supporting and propping up reactionary forces who are no more real third parties than are the former Nazi party members of western Germany.

It is when Lattimore gets out of the realm of trying to set up a sharp policy for his version of present day world "power politics" that he is at his best in "The Situation In Asia." There is no doubt that, more than most American "experts" on the Far East, the author is well versed in his subject and has seen through the blunders of Western, and particularly American, policy up to now. In determining Asia's sympathies, Lattimore says that more than the commonly repeated phrases about communism and democracy are involved. Aspects related to these theories which are often overlooked by America are reacted to by native elements. There is no doubt that few Asians see a Russian threat to their freedom and livelihood. In Asia, communism is attractive because it has a sure-fire program which is based on an historically developing nationalism and the destruction of feudalism linked with foreign imperialism. One of the grand American delusions, according to Lattimore, has been the idea that supporting people who have a feudal conception of the nature of property and the rights of the individual is tantamount to supporting capitalism. "The inclination," Lattimore asserts, "to call Marxism progressive, and the increasing tendency to take the word 'democratic' away from Europe and America and give it to Marxism and Russia, are among the hard facts of the Asia of today."

With the kind of China which American diplomacy wanted already lost even while this book was being written it would seem advisable that some heed be given to what Lattimore has to say about America's "bastion" in the East, namely Japan. In a chapter, "Japan Is Nobody's Ally," he claims that American policy is based on the assumption that as Japan goes,

so goes Asia. This is then linked with a chain of assumptions which he terms a cluster of fantasies. The first link is that Japan can be made not only into a workshop, but one that controls Asia. The second is the equally fanciful theory that Japan can become a reliable bulwark against Russia. The third and most fanciful of all, is that there is only one Japan, a solid, internally indivisible unit, like one trained seal. What Lattimore sees in Japan is the almost predestined fact that, like every other country in Asia, Japan will be affected by the rising tide on that continent and after getting every possible kind of help from America will slip out from under American control. The possibility that as Japan goes, so goes Asia is a decreasing possibility. Instead the increasing possibility is that as Asia goes, so goes Japan. Thus, as in China, present American policy in Japan is lining itself up for a drastic defeat.

Although the book was written about a year ago, many of Lattimore's comments on China, especially with regard to American policy, have not been affected by the epoch shaking events which took place here in that period. For Americans, he told them that the Nationalists were finished and that there would be a coalition government, led by the Communists. He said that China would have to have a coalition government, because in order to administer without chaos, the Communists must deal with many groups. His warning to American dreams of continued support to Nationalist remnants certainly reads true today. "We must also abandon the stubbornly lingering delusion that we can somehow maintain footholds by supporting rump territories or rump governments. . . Any diehard Chinese political or military group that tries to stay in business by combining anti-communism with the dividing up of China's territory and sovereignty is doomed. Any such attempt will be swept away. . . The new government of China will claim China's Big Five position in the United Nations . . . we could delay China in moving into this position—but only by such *reductio ad absurdum* as pretending that the island of Formosa is 'China.'"

While it may be presumptuous on the part of a reviewer to proffer advice to official American "experts on China" now advancing the theory that China is well on its way to puppetship under the Russians, it might help if they paid some attention to Lattimore. As he sees it, from the Russian point of view there is no need to push beyond the present state of affairs in China. A China which America is out of is enough to safeguard Russia's continental flank in Asia. Even if Russia wanted to take over China it would run into all sorts of difficulties, different from those which defeated Japan and America, but always present. Just as America, after pouring in about four billion dollars before it was proved useless, could not mastermind China, the Russians are also unable to simply stroll in and nonchalantly take over. The plain fact is that the Russians, unlike America, have realized that what counts in China is the kind of government evolved by the Chinese political, economic, social and military forces and not money and advisors.

In an America which is today suffering from an inclination to see Red at the drop of a hat, it is not difficult to envision Lattimore being smeared as a follower of the "Moscow line." Actually, he is not, but has tried to maintain what he apparently considers an objective, independent position from which he can weigh and estimate all factors on all sides. He often says Russia's policy is sounder, more astute and more progressive than America's. He also says that America is greatly confused and in many cases plainly wrong in its Asia policy.

However, all through the book Lattimore betrays an important limitation in his approach to the Asian situation. While appreciating the dynamic nature of the new political philosophy in contrast to the decadence of the old, he still tends to view the situation as one which is basically a struggle between two titans, the US and the Soviet Union. Although this is true to a certain degree in that each is the leader of the nations in its camp, the expulsion of the Western capitalists from Asia and the subsequent rooting out of the various forms of economic and political colonialism fostered by this group, does not mean the establishment of a new imperialism directed from Moscow anymore than did the first capitalist nation, England, dominate the later arrivals such as France, Germany and the US. Lattimore himself states that it is impossible any longer for any nation to make puppets out of Asia yet he still insists on looking at the situation in terms of late 19th and early 20th century struggles for power.

It is strictly this type of thinking which has caused Lattimore to go wrong on his idea that China would be a "third country." By now it has been made quite clear that China will "lean to one side." China will in the future probably be much closer to Russia than to any other nation, but this does not mean that the relationship beween Peking and Moscow will necessarily be similar to that which formerly existed between Nanking and Washington. The new relations will be close because both subscribe to the same philosophy, while the old relationship was close because Nanking was a supplicant, while Washington was a giver.

There are also comparatively minor points of criticism and disagreement with the author. In the course of dealing with Asia, an area where few Western scholars are more at home, Lattimore finds himself compelled to discuss Yugoslavian relations with Russia in just a few pages. In doing this he leaves himself open to criticism not only for sparse coverage but also for having made various categorical statements without his customary documentation and in a field far from his usual one. Another highly debatable point is the surprising revelation that he seemingly belongs to the "Chiang was not thoroughly bad, but it was the rascals around him" school.

In arriving at this theory regarding the man who, more than any single individual, is responsible for the bleeding and milking of his own coutry to satisfy the personal interests of himself and a small clique, Lattimore leaves himself open for severe criticism.

LETTERS

(Continued from page 115)

an old-fashioned wooden weaving machine at one end. On the wall hung a portrait of General Lin and a picture of personnel of the Committee to Support the Front in Manchuria. The only furniture I saw of any value was an old table placed against the wall.

When I arrived at his gate, his sister-in-law had just returned from the farm. She was quiet, simple, robust and cordial. She offered me a cup of tea and some cigarettes and we sat down to have a talk.

"After General Lin's arrival in Hankow, will he come home?"

"No," she replied in a Hupeh accent, adding, "I have never seen him."

Just then one of Lin's cousins came to participate in our talk.

"He was only sixteen when he left home; it is more than twenty years now," his cousin said.

"He is too busy in national affairs to come back and look at his native place," his sister-in-law continued with a smile.

She told me that her family had three acres of land. When the KMT soldiers were stationed here, his house was often ransacked and they had to flee to other places for safety. Therefore, their farm was deserted from time to time.

"How do you support your family?" I asked curiously.

"We depend on the cloth I weave," she replied, touching the machine.

"Doesn't the government offer you something?"

"No," she said and added, "This place was liberated not long ago."

"Why doesn't General Lin send you some aid?"

"We need no special aid; we are glad to maintain our own living by our own labor."

CHANG SHU-CHI

Changsha
December 25, 1949

LATINIZATION

To The Editor:

Allow me a few words of comment on your Mr. Berges' fine article regarding the Latinization of the Chinese language. I found it to be most informative and well done but I would like to present one criticism.

The author continually says that earlier attempts to reform the language failed basically because those in political power did not want widespread educational reform. Thus, it seems to me, he lays undue stress on the importance of Latinxua as a system. As far as any Latinization of Chinese goes any system whose symbols can reproduce the exact pronounciation of the sounds in the language is useable. Therefore, it would stand to reason that the most important factor is the intent of the authorities to carry out Latinization, which admittedly is the intention of the present government. Whether the system used is Latinxua, Kuoyu Lomatze, Phonetic Signs or the International Phonetic System the vital point is to have those in power make serious use of one of these systems and see that the movement for simplifying the Chinese language for the masses is carried out.

One other small point, in referring to Kuoyu Lomatze the author claims that it was based on Peking dialect and not on putunghua. This is not the case and the very name Kuoyu refers to the national language which was Mandarin at the time of the installation of this system. It also might interest the author to know that this system can be quite easily used to represent any of the many dialects to be found throughout China.

J. F. S.

Shanghai
January 17, 1950

The Review's English Lesson CXV

Colloquialisms

FOR this week's English Lesson we turn to a short story which appeared in a recent issue of the *Review* entitled "Sanitation Commissioner," written by Ke Lo and translated by Sidney Shapiro. In the translation the characters in the story make free use of colloquial, or common, everyday speech, rather than formal English phraseology. While this style of writing obviously lends warmth and naturalness to the narrative it is likely to confront the reader with terms and phrases with which he is not entirely familiar. This is not surprising when one considers that in every country the world over the common, everyday speech of the people differs from the purely formal conventional language. Thus, the people of each country, area or group express themselves in the idiom, or language construction, peculiar to that area or group.

In China, foreign students of the Chinese language are frequently puzzled by expressions whose meanings are other than the words in the phrase would indicate. Thus, the expression *ma ma hu hu* (馬馬虎虎), "horse horse tiger tiger," is not a direct reference to animals but is used to convey the idea that something is inferior or not up to standard. Likewise, the term *pao huang kua-erh*, formerly heard in and around Hangchow, Chekiang. Literally, this phrase means to peel the cucumber (刨黃瓜兒), but colloquially speaking it means to extort high prices from tourists. Similarly, some of the colloquial terms and phrases that Mr. Shapiro has so skillfully employed in his translation may be confusing to the reader who has not spent some time in the United States. Hence, we propose to quote several of these phrases from the text and to offer explanations and definitions.

* * *

"Butting into women's business." To butt into means to intrude into other people's affairs, or to enter into without invitation. For example, there is the admonition; 'don't butt in when another person is talking.'

"One day I called for the cadre and the **progressives.**" As used here, the word progressives refers to people of advanced social and political understanding.

"After all, I'm the **guy** who **bawls** other **people out.**" The term **guy** is widely used in America to refer to a man, or a fellow, although it is never used to address a person directly. It is generally used in the third person, i.e., 'this guy,' 'that guy,' 'the other guy,' or in the first person as used by the sanitation commissioner in the story. To **bawl out** means to scold severely or reprimand a person.

"This gave my wife the **giggles.**" What was said caused the commissioner's wife to laugh in a frivolous, high-pitched manner, to giggle.

"Mama then **puts in her two cents.**" This colloquial phrase does not actually involve the use of money, as it would seem. As used here is means that Mama added her opinion to those already expressed. It is commonly used when referring to unsolicited and unwelcome advice during a discussion.

"Our Sonny is getting himself **all tricked out** like a groom. All tricked out means to be ornately adorned. All tricked out like a groom means to be completely attired in the formal clothes of a man about to be married.

"I just **burn** and don't answer her." The word burn as used in this sentence means to feel as if on fire, or excessively heated, from emotion or anger. The slang expression, burn up, means to be very angry. For example: 'when he heard such talk he would burn up.'

"If the doctor . . . is in town he can give her a **shot.**" In this sentence a **shot** refers to a dose of medicine "shot" into the body by injection.

"If you want to eat, you've got to do productive work. Swindling is **out.**" The word **out** as used here is doubtless a short form of the phrase, out of the question, meaning that the practice of swindling is no longer permissible.

"The **old buzzard** had plenty of **angles.**" A buzzard is a large hawk-like bird of prey. **Old buzzard** is a mildly derogatory term used to describe a crafty old person. To say that he had 'plenty of **angles,**' means that he was capable of using various schemes, artifices and tricks to his own advantage.

"I don't give a hoot in hell what you people decided." This expression, commonly heard in the rural areas of the United States, has no particular meaning. It's value would seem to lie in the euphony and emphasis it adds to a statement. The word **hoot** means to shout.

"But Mama and my mother-in-law . . . began giving me a **sales talk** on the witch doctor." The expression **sales talk** has become a definite American colloquialism and refers to the technique of persuading a person to purchase an article which he may neither need nor want. The term is likewise used to describe an effort to win a person over to a particular viewpoint by "selling the idea," such as the attempt, in the sentence above, to overcome the sanitation commissioner's objection to calling in the witch doctor.

"Their faces were **frozen.**" The word **frozen** here does not imply that their faces were stiff from the effects of severe cold. They were so startled at what they heard or saw that their faces took on a fixed expression.

"I couldn't **take it.**" This expression means, 'I cannot stand it,' (endure it) and is quite similar to the Chinese phrase *shou pu liao* (受不了).

"I wash my hands of the whole **damn business.**" To wash one's hands of anything means to have nothing more to do with it. The word **damn** is a mild curse word. The most common use of the word **business** refers to trade, commerce or manufacturing, but it has other colloquial meanings. For example: to let children play with matches is dangerous business; or, improper activities are called 'funny business,' or, I will make it my business to write him a letter.

"Even the **die-hards** finally all **came around.**" A **die-hard** is one who fanatically resists even after it has become clear that further resistance is futile. **Came around** in the above sentence means that the die-hards finally accepted the new state of things, the changed situation.

"Now if my wife has a headache—I **kid** Mama." The slang word **kid** means to tease or joke with.

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